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PARDONING IMMIGRANTS
PETER L. MARKOWITZ* & LINDSAY NASH†‡
In the waning days of the Obama Administration, with Trump’s promised immi-
gration crackdown looming, over one hundred advocacy organizations joined
forces to urge President Obama to permanently protect hundreds of thousands of
immigrants from deportation by pardoning their breaches of civil immigration law.
That pardon never materialized and, as expected, the Trump enforcement regime is
sowing terror and devastation in immigrant communities nationwide. While it
seems unfathomable that the current President would use his pardon power to miti-
gate even the most extreme applications of our nation’s immigration laws, there is
unfortunately no indication that the harshest aspects of the immigration laws are
likely to be revised by the current political branches. Accordingly, future Presidents
will likely once again face the questions of how they may use prosecutorial discre-
tion generally, and the pardon power specifically, to address the human toll of such
laws. Since the Founding, the pardon power has been used primarily to forgive
individual criminal convictions. Thus the broad civil immigration pardon, which
Obama declined to issue, would have raised novel questions regarding the appro-
priate boundaries of the presidential pardon power. Resolution of those previously
unexplored questions is necessary to help future Presidents determine whether their
pardon power can serve as a safety valve to alleviate the disproportionate penalties
that our immigration laws have imposed on longtime members of our communities.
This Article explores the novel concept of a civil immigration pardon. Specifically,
it closely examines the language and drafting history of the Pardon Clause, exhaus-
tively reviews early and modern pardon practice and jurisprudence, and considers
whether a President could, consistent with the Constitution, use that power to pro-
tect some of the largest categories of noncitizens currently at risk of deportation.
Ultimately, it argues that the President possesses the constitutional authority to cate-
gorically pardon broad classes of immigrants for civil violations of the immigration
laws and to thereby provide durable and permanent protections against deporta-
tion. As millions of noncitizens and their families face a historically unprecedented
wave of deportations and as traditional mechanisms for policymaking continue to
fail, the immigration pardon offers an important tool for future Presidents to for-
give the civil offenses that result in some of the harshest penalties in our nation’s
justice system.
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
† Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
‡ We are grateful to Farrin Anello, Rose Cuison-Villazor, Natasha Ferna´ndez-Silber,
Mark Fleming, David Hausman, Nicolas Keller, Dan Kesselbrenner, David C. Lachman,
Jessica A. Martinez, and Mark Ross for their contributions to the research and thought
underlying this Article. We also thank the Center for Popular Democracy, Make the Road
New York, and the National Day Laborer Organizing Network, as well as the many other
individuals and groups that spearheaded the effort to persuade President Obama to issue
an immigration pardon and helped shape our thinking. We are indebted to Stephanie
Alvarez-Jones, Michael Bernstein, Rehana Jamal, and Eric Pilch for their superb research
assistance. Copyright © 2018 by Peter L. Markowitz & Lindsay Nash.
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INTRODUCTION
In the closing days of the Obama Administration, with the Trump
presidency looming, immigrants and their advocates besieged the
White House with a long list of urgent requests for final presidential
actions that could help protect immigrants from the storm
approaching on the horizon. One such request, delivered in a letter
from over one hundred community-based and immigrant advocacy
organizations, was a plea for President Obama to use his pardon
power to issue a categorical pardon that would permanently protect a
broad swath of immigrants from deportation.1 While President
Obama had become notorious during his presidency, labeled the
“Deporter-in-Chief” for deporting more immigrants than any other
1 Letter from Action NC et al. to President Barack Obama (Dec. 5, 2016), https://
populardemocracy.typeform.com/to/tairNm; see Caitlin Dickerson, A Creative Plea from
Immigrants, and a Ticking Clock for Obama, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/12/20/us/a-creative-plea-from-immigrants-and-a-ticking-clock-for-
obama.html. The authors were heavily involved in the drafting of this letter and drafted the
accompanying memorandum that was prepared for the White House Counsel in support of
the immigration pardon request. Much of the analysis contained in this Article is drawn
from that memorandum.
40084-nyu_93-1 Sheet No. 32 Side B      04/02/2018   14:13:19
40084-nyu_93-1 Sheet No. 32 Side B      04/02/2018   14:13:19
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\93-1\NYU102.txt unknown Seq: 3 28-MAR-18 14:47
60 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:58
President in history, in the final years of his presidency, Obama insti-
tuted a meaningful prosecutorial discretion policy, which functionally
exempted many immigrants from deportation.2 The letter from com-
munity groups asked President Obama to make permanent certain
aspects of his prosecutorial discretion policy and protect hundreds of
thousands of immigrants from deportation by pardoning their
breaches of the immigration laws. Pardons are one of the few presi-
dential actions that cannot be undone by future Presidents and thus,
with candidate Trump’s vitriolic anti-immigrant rhetoric still ringing in
the ears of immigrants across the country, the idea of a wide-scale
immigration pardon garnered significant media and community
attention.3
Although immigrants and their advocates were once again disap-
pointed by President Obama, who declined to exercise his pardon
power on behalf of immigrants, the advocacy effort led to the concep-
tual development of a potent new legal mechanism—the immigration
pardon—that could play an important role in future efforts to imbue
our immigration system with some sense of proportionality and
humanity. The Obama Administration’s decision not to issue the
2 See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to
Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, R. Gil
Kerlikowske, Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Le´on Rodriguez, Dir., U.S.
Citizenship & Immigration Servs., & Alan D. Bersin, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Policy
(Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf (setting forth enforcement priorities that
functionally exempted most immigrants living in the United States who had no, or very
minor criminal records, from becoming targets of Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) enforcement actions); see also Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Le´on Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs.,
Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, & R. Gil
Kerlikowske, Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/
sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf (setting forth guidelines
that sought to vastly expand the group of noncitizens eligible for prosecutorial discretion,
though this memorandum was eventually enjoined from taking effect and thus never went
into operation); Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to
David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Alejandro Mayorkas,
Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., & John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration &
Customs Enf’t (June 15, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-
prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf (setting forth
guidelines for granting prosecutorial discretion to a large category of noncitizens who, inter
alia, were brought to the United States as children).
3 See, e.g., Dickerson, supra note 1; Stephen Legomsky, Pardoning Lawful Immigrants
for Minor Offenses, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 16, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
stephen-legomsky/pardoning-lawful-immigran_b_14203040.html; Laura Litvan, Obama
Should Pardon “Dreamer” Immigrants, Democrats Say, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 17, 2016),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-17/obama-should-pardon-dreamer-
immigrants-house-democrats-say; Peter L. Markowitz, Can Obama Pardon Millions of
Immigrants?, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/06/opinion/can-
obama-pardon-millions-of-immigrants.html.
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immigration pardon was likely driven more by politics than by law,
but the requested pardon would have been a novel exercise of the
pardon power and thus various potential legal objections could also
have formed the basis for the President’s decision not to act. While it
seems unfathomable that the current occupant of the Oval Office
would consider using his pardon power to mitigate even the most
brutal applications of our nation’s immigration laws, there is no indi-
cation that the harshest aspects of the immigration laws are likely to
be revised by the current political branches in the foreseeable future.
Accordingly, we can expect that future Presidents will once again face
the question of how prosecutorial discretion generally, and the pardon
power specifically, may or may not be used to address the human toll
of such laws. This Article seeks to address, for the first time, the legal
questions necessary to evaluate a President’s ability to use categorical
pardons as a policymaking tool in the immigration realm.
The Pardon Clause grants the President authority to effectively
forgive any individual who has committed an offense against the
United States and thereby protect that person from the legal penalties
she could otherwise face.4 A pardon can protect an individual from
prosecution or can functionally overturn a conviction and punishment
after it has been imposed.5 However, while the language of the clause
extends to all “[o]ffences against the United States,”6 it has been exer-
cised almost exclusively in individual criminal cases.7 Deportation
offenses are civil—not criminal—in nature and thus a critical
threshold question is whether the pardon power can extend to civil
offenses generally and to deportation offenses specifically.8 In addi-
tion, while there is significant historical precedent for widespread
4 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
5 Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120 (1925).
6 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
7 See Noah A. Messing, A New Power?: Civil Offenses and Presidential Clemency, 64
BUFF. L. REV. 661, 661 (2016). One notable and recent exception, however, is President
Trump’s pardon of Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, EXECUTIVE GRANT OF CLEMENCY TO JOSEPH M. ARPAIO (Aug. 25, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/pardon/file/993586/download. The infamous Sheriff Arpaio was
held in contempt by a federal court for failing to adhere to its order to stop making
unauthorized immigration arrests. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Maggie Haberman, Trump
Pardons Joe Arpaio, Who Became Face of Crackdown on Illegal Immigration, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 25, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2vwUubN. Contempt, however, is not a crime. See
discussion infra notes 73–82 and accompanying text. Accordingly, the Arpaio pardon is the
most recent example of a noncriminal pardon.
8 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010) (noting that while “deportation is a
particularly severe ‘penalty,’ . . . it is not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction”); Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (establishing the civil nature of deportation
proceedings).
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categorical pardons, which the Supreme Court has recognized,9 there
is no clear modern Supreme Court authority endorsing such broad use
of the pardon authority. In the context of the modern administrative
state, the ability to issue categorical pardons for civil offenses could
represent a significant expansion of presidential pardon authority and
thus would have serious implications for the Constitution’s delicate
balance and separation of powers between the executive, legislature,
and judiciary. Accordingly, the present inquiry requires not only a full
consideration of the historical precedent and origins of the pardon
power, but also of the modern implications of categorical immigration
pardons on our constitutional system.
Pardons are the most robust form of the executive’s more general
prosecutorial discretion powers. In recent years, Presidents have
increasingly used systematic categorical prosecutorial discretion as a
policymaking tool. Most famously, President Obama used his
prosecutorial discretion power to categorically forgo the deportation
of certain undocumented immigrants who came to the United States
as children.10 Before him, President George W. Bush also used robust
assertions of categorical prosecutorial discretion to achieve policy
goals in the environmental, civil rights, antitrust, labor, and securities
enforcement arenas, to name a few.11 President Trump has threatened
to use his prosecutorial discretion power to undermine the Affordable
Care Act by refusing to enforce penalties for individuals who fail to
comply with the law’s healthcare mandates.12 While there is very lim-
ited relevant literature exploring civil or categorical pardons,13 there
9 See infra Section IV.A.
10 Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 2; see also Peter L. Markowitz,
Prosecutorial Discretion Power at Its Zenith: The Power to Protect Liberty, 97 B.U. L. REV.
489, 507–14 (2017) (cataloging these and other assertions of robust prosecutorial discretion
in the immigration arena).
11 Markowitz, supra note 10, at 501–07 (cataloging these and other modern assertions
of robust prosecutorial discretion as a policymaking tool).
12 See, e.g., Danielle Kurtzleben, Even Without Congress, the Trump Administration
Can Still Redo Obamacare, NPR (Mar. 29, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/
2017/03/29/521713002/even-without-congress-the-trump-administration-can-still-redo-
obamacare; Ashley Parker & Amy Goldstein, Trump Signs Executive Order That Could
Effectively Gut Affordable Care Act’s Individual Mandate, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-signs-executive-order-that-could-lift-
affordable-care-acts-individual-mandate/2017/01/20/8c99e35e-df70-11e6-b2cf-
b67fe3285cbc_story.html; Trump May Not Enforce Individual Health Insurance Mandate:
Aide , REUTERS (Jan. 22, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-obamacare-
idUSKBN1560SX.
13 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Clemency and Presidential Administration of Criminal
Law, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 802, 836–37 (2015) (discussing categorical pardons); Messing,
supra note 7 (discussing civil pardons); Zachary S. Price, Reliance on Nonenforcement, 58
WM. & MARY L. REV. 937, 1021–23 (2017) (discussing categorical pardons). A few scholars
have specifically explored the role of pardons in the immigration arena. See, e.g., Jason A.
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has been increased scholarly attention, in recent years, to this more
general trend of policymaking through prosecutorial discretion in the
immigration arena and beyond.14 This Article seeks to build upon this
important existing body of scholarship.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I sets forth the founda-
tional nature and limits of the pardon power and draws into focus the
critical, unresolved questions related to the broad use of the pardon
power in the immigration realm. Part II explores the relevance of the
civil-criminal divide to the pardon power. We conclude that the
pardon power is not limited to the criminal realm; however, that does
not mean that all civil provisions are pardonable. Rather, the constitu-
tional text and framing history, as well as historical practice and juris-
prudence, support the conclusion that the President may pardon any
federal civil penalty but may not use his pardon power to relieve indi-
viduals of applications of civil regulatory qualifications. While the line
between the two is not always easily drawn, this divide is well sup-
ported by historical practice and authority and preserves an appro-
priate balance of powers between the respective branches of the
federal government. Part III applies these limits to the immigration
context and concludes, for at least two sizable categories of immi-
grants, that immigration pardons can provide significant protections.
Pardons are effective at protecting certain immigrants with legal
status, such as lawful permanent residents with criminal convictions,
from deportation. While pardons cannot convey status to undocu-
mented immigrants, many of the critical barriers to status for undocu-
mented immigrants are best conceived of as civil penalties, and thus a
Cade, Deporting the Pardoned, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 355 (2012); Samuel T. Morison,
Presidential Pardons and Immigration Law, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 253 (2010). But the
existing scholarship does not address the power of the President to pardon immigration
offenses directly. See Cade, supra, at 371–73 (discussing the immigration consequences of a
gubernatorial pardon of a state crime); Morison, supra (discussing the immigration
consequences of a presidential pardon of a federal crime).
14 See, e.g., SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES 14–32 (2015); Kate Andrias, The
President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1034 (2013); Adam B. Cox &
Cristina M. Rodrı´guez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 464 (2009)
[hereinafter Cox & Rodrı´guez, President and Immigration Law]; Adam B. Cox & Cristina
M. Rodrı´guez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104, 113 (2015)
[hereinafter Cox & Rodrı´guez, Redux]; Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On:
The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and
the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 783 (2013); Markowitz, supra note 10; Gerald
L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 614 (2006); Zachary S.
Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 717 (2014);
Michael Sant’Ambrogio, The Extra-Legislative Veto, 102 GEO. L.J. 351, 411 (2014); Shoba
Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 9 CONN.
PUB. INT. L.J. 243, 244 (2010).
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pardon can effectively eliminate such barriers. Finally, in Part IV we
explore the potential application of the immigration pardon power.
Pardoning individual immigrants is a clear and important application
but, perhaps more critically, we look to the history of, and authority
for, categorical pardons. We conclude that categorical immigration
pardons are a potentially important presidential tool for immigration
policymaking that future officeholders should consider going forward.
I
THE FOUNDATIONAL NATURE AND LIMITS OF THE
PARDON POWER
The Pardon Clause of the Constitution states that the President
“shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences
against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.”15 The
Supreme Court has historically taken an expansive view of the
President’s pardon power. The Court has described the power as
“unlimited, with the exception” of impeachment and explained that it
“extends to every offence known to the law, and may be exercised at
any time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are
taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment.”16
The Court has further explained that the Pardon Clause grants the
President the “ultimate authority” to determine “that the public wel-
fare will be better served” by mercy than by full applications of the
penalties proscribed by law.17
In addition to the textual limitation prohibiting the application of
the pardon power to cases of impeachment, there are three axiomatic
boundaries that constrain the President’s pardon power. First, the lan-
guage “offenses against the United States” makes clear that the
15 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
16 Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866); see, e.g., Proclamation No. 4311,
39 Fed. Reg. 32,601, 32,601–02 (Sept. 10, 1974) (pardoning former President Nixon in
advance of any prosecution); see also Samuel E. Schoenburg, Note, Clemency, War
Powers, and Guanta´namo, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 917, 923 (2016) (“[T]he Framers adopted a
final text of Article II that allowed the President to ‘single-handedly and conclusively’
pardon offenses at any point after commission, even before trial.”); cf. Power of the
President to Remit Fines Against Defaulting Jurors, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 458, 460 (1845)
(“The elementary writers on the constitutional law of the United States state the
President’s power of pardon as follows, (Kent, vol. i, p. 284:) ‘The power of pardon vested
in the President is without any limitation, except in the single case of impeachments.’”
(emphasis added)).
17 Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927); see also Burdick v. United States, 236
U.S. 79, 95 (1915) (explaining that the categorical pardons are generally based on the
President’s assessment that “forgiveness” is “more expedient for the public welfare than
prosecution and punishment”).
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President cannot pardon state law offenses.18 This limit is consistent
with our federal system of dual sovereigns. Second, the pardon power
may not be used to interfere with privately vested rights—such as civil
suits between two private parties—because only offenses “against the
United States” may be pardoned.19 Finally, as the Supreme Court has
explained, a pardon may only be issued for an offense “after its com-
mission.”20 The President may not grant anyone advance permission
to violate the law. That is what distinguishes the pardon power from
the repudiated dispensing and suspending powers, whereby the
English King at common law was empowered to grant individuals pro-
spective exemptions from operation of a law.21
These well-established principles of pardon law, however, do
little alone to clarify the central questions upon which we focus. In
considering whether the pardon power can reach civil immigration
offenses, it is beyond question that these offenses are federal in
nature, can only be pardoned, if at all, after commission, and that
immigration offenses would not implicate the prohibition of dis-
turbing privately vested rights. Thus, these principles do not foreclose
the possibility of immigration pardons, but neither do they elucidate
whether immigration offenses are “offenses against the United States”
within the meaning of the Pardon Clause. Moreover, these founda-
tional principles of pardon law simply do not address the appropriate-
ness of categorical versus individual pardons.
However, critically for the current inquiry, the Supreme Court
has been clear, consistent, and emphatic in its holdings regarding
another foundational principle of pardon law: that the reach of the
pardon power is strictly a question of constitutional law and cannot be
limited in any way by Congress. As the Court explained in 1974, “the
18 See Hickey v. Schomig, 240 F. Supp. 2d 793, 795 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (“[N]o federal
official has the authority to commute a sentence imposed by a state court.”); Office of the
Pardon Att’y, Pardon Information and Instructions , U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://
www.justice.gov/pardon/pardon-information-and-instructions (last updated Oct. 12, 2017)
(“[T]he President cannot pardon a state criminal offense.”).
19 See Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108 (1925); Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.)
307, 312 (1855); see also Messing, supra note 7, at 694 (demonstrating the broad reach of
pardon power at common law “so long as the rights of private parties were not impaired”);
discussion infra notes 62–63 and accompanying text (establishing that the presidential
pardon power is co-extensive with the analogous power enjoyed by the King of England at
the time of the framing).
20 Garland, 71 U.S. at 380 (emphasis added); see also Grossman, 267 U.S. at 120 (“The
executive can reprieve or pardon all offenses after their commission, either before trial,
during trial or after trial . . . .” (emphasis added)).
21 See THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 103–04 (Max Farrand
ed., 1966) (explaining that the record of the Constitutional Convention demonstrates that
the delegates unanimously rejected an effort to grant “suspending” powers to the
President); see also Price, supra note 14, at 693.
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unbroken practice since 1790 compels the conclusion that the power
flows from the Constitution alone, not from any legislative enact-
ments, and that it cannot be modified, abridged, or diminished by the
Congress.”22 One of the leading cases regarding the effect of a presi-
dential pardon demonstrates this point.23 In Ex parte Garland,
Congress enacted a statute which required that any person wishing to
practice in federal court take an oath asserting that he had never vol-
untarily borne arms against the United States.24 The petitioner, Mr.
Garland, had been a member of the Confederacy but had received a
full presidential pardon for his actions.25 Nevertheless, he was effec-
tively barred from practicing in federal court because he could not
truthfully take the required oath.26 The Supreme Court held that the
statute could not operate to limit the pardon and that Garland was
therefore entitled to practice without taking the oath.27 Specifically,
the Court held that the pardon power “is not subject to legislative
control. Congress can neither limit the effect of his pardon, nor
exclude from its exercise any class of offenders. The benign preroga-
tive of mercy reposed in him cannot be fettered by any legislative
restrictions.”28
The principle that only the Constitution, and not Congress, can
limit the pardon power is critical to the inquiry at hand. Federal immi-
gration law does have a provision that arguably purports to limit the
President’s pardon authority in the immigration realm.29 Specifically,
the law dictates that only a “full and unconditional pardon by the
22 Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 266 (1974); see also Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 485 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[W]here the Constitution by
explicit text commits the power at issue to the exclusive control of the President, we have
refused to tolerate any intrusion by the Legislative Branch. . . . [W]e [have] reiterated . . .
that Congress cannot interfere in any way with the President’s power to pardon.”);
Garland, 71 U.S. at 380 (“This power of the President [i.e., the pardon power] is not
subject to legislative control. Congress can neither limit the effect of his pardon, nor
exclude from its exercise any class of offenders. The benign prerogative of mercy reposed
in him cannot be fettered by any legislative restrictions.”); Effects of a Presidential Pardon,
19 Op. O.L.C. 160, 161 (1995) (stating that “congressional legislation cannot define or limit
the effect of a presidential pardon”).
23 Garland, 71 U.S. at 333.
24 Id. at 334.
25 Id. at 336–37.
26 Id. at 357.
27 Id. at 381.
28 Id. at 380; see also United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1871) (holding
that a different statute seeking to diminish the effect of the post-Civil War pardons was
also invalid because it “impair[ed] the effect of a pardon, and thus infring[ed] the
constitutional power of the Executive”); see also discussion infra notes 185–89 and
accompanying text (discussing how pardons have been used throughout history as an
essential check against overly harsh congressional action).
29 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(vi) (2012).
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President of the United States” for a “criminal conviction” can protect
an individual from deportation based on that criminal conviction.30 In
addition, the law expressly exempts certain criminal removal grounds,
such as the removal ground triggered by controlled substance convic-
tions, which purportedly would still operate even in the face of a full
and unconditional presidential pardon of a controlled substance
conviction.31
If this statutory term were effective to limit the President’s
pardon power, it would significantly constrain the President’s ability
to issue the contemplated immigration pardons. For example, the vast
majority of individuals who are deportable for criminal convictions
have state, not federal, convictions.32 Since the President cannot
pardon state crimes, under this provision of law he is purportedly
impotent to pardon the federal civil removal offense that flows from
state crimes—insofar as such a pardon would not be a “full and
unconditional pardon” for a criminal conviction. Since only “full and
unconditional pardons” are deemed effective by Congress,33 that
would mean the President could never pardon a federal deportation
offense flowing from a state conviction. In addition, if Congress could
limit the President’s pardon power, this provision of immigration law
would prevent her from pardoning anyone who is deportable because
of a controlled substance conviction. However, as Samuel Morison has
ably explained, the well-established principle set forth above dictates
that whatever Congress’s intent was with this statutory provision, the
statute cannot effectively impose any limit whatsoever on the
President’s constitutional pardon power.34 Accordingly, the inquiry
that remains then is whether the pardon power is limited to the crim-
inal realm and, if not, whether it can operate against civil immigration
offenses.
30 Id.
31 § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (provision for deportation based on controlled substances
conviction).
32 Stephen Lee, De Facto Immigration Courts, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 553, 576–77 (2013)
(“[T]he reality is that the vast majority of convictions within the United States arise from
violations of state law. Nationwide, 99 percent of all arrests, 94 percent of felony
convictions, and 93 percent of prison sentences can be traced to decisions by state and local
actors.”).
33 § 1227(a)(2)(A)(vi).
34 Morison, supra note 13, at 324–25.
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II
EXPLORING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE PARDON POWER
 BEYOND THE CRIMINAL REALM
A. Pardoning Civil Offenses Against the United States
1. Text, Drafting History, and Early Exercise of the Pardon Power
As with all constitutional inquiries, we start with the text itself. It
is notable, first, that the Framers used the term “offences” in the
Pardon Clause and not “crimes.” This is particularly true since the
words “crimes,” “criminal case,” and “criminal prosecution” are used
in many other places in the Constitution,35 apparently indicating that,
when the Framers meant to limit a provision to the criminal context,
they did so clearly. Thus, well-accepted canons of statutory construc-
tion dictate that the decision to use the term “offences” rather than
“crimes” in the Pardon Clause should be given effect and suggest that
“offences” should be afforded a different meaning than “crimes.”36
The leading dictionary and treatise from the Founding period
demonstrate that the terms “offense” and “crime” permit of distinct
meanings.37 The leading dictionary of the Founding era, authored by
Samuel Johnson, provides two relevant definitions for “Offence”: (1)
“Crime; act of wickedness” and (2) “[a] transgression.”38 The latter
definition demonstrates, as the canons of statutory construction sug-
gest, that at the time of the Founding, the word “offense” could carry
35 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (subjecting the President to impeachment for “high
Crimes and Misdemeanors”); id. art. III, § 2 (defining the jurisdiction of the judiciary to
include “The Trial of all Crimes”); id. art. IV, § 2 (requiring that a person “charged in any
State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime” who flees shall be returned to the “State
having Jurisdiction of the Crime”); id. amend. V (establishing various rights for people
accused of “capital, or otherwise infamous crime” and for people in “any criminal case”);
id. amend. VI (establishing various rights for people in “criminal prosecutions”); id.
amend. XIII (prohibiting involuntary servitude except as “punishment for crime”); id.
amend. XIV, § 2 (permitting disenfranchisement for “participation in rebellion, or other
crime”). The only other place the word “offences” is used is in describing “Offences
against the Law of Nations” in Article I, Section 8.
36 See generally Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 711 n.9 (2004) (explaining that
where a statute uses “certain language in one part of the statute and different language in
another” it indicates that “different meanings were intended”); Myers v. United States, 272
U.S. 52, 237 (1926) (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (explaining that the “Constitution must be
interpreted by attributing to its words the meaning which they bore at the time of its
adoption, and in view of commonly-accepted canons of construction, its history, early and
long-continued practices under it, and relevant opinions of this court” (emphasis added)).
37 See Messing, supra note 7, at 712–13 (surveying Founding-era treatises and
dictionaries regarding the meaning of the words “offenses” and “pardon”).
38 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 220 (7th ed.
1783). The Supreme Court has relied upon this dictionary as a key source of constitutional
meaning. See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2561 (2014) (citing Johnson’s
dictionary).
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a broader and distinct meaning from the word “crime.” This distinc-
tion is confirmed by the leading legal treatise at the time, which also
used the word “offense” more broadly than crimes to include trans-
gressions punishable only by fines.39 Similarly, definitions of “pardon”
during the period went beyond mere forgiveness for a crime and also
included “[f]orgiveness of an offender” and “[r]emission of [a] pen-
alty.”40 Thus, the common usage of the words “offense” and
“pardon,” as used at the time of the Founding, supports the inference
from the text that “offense” was intended to have a distinct and
broader meaning than the word “crime.”
While the drafting history of the Pardon Clause is limited,41 it
lends some modest additional support to the contention that the
pardon power was not intended to be limited to the criminal context.
The first draft of the Pardon Clause was proposed by Charles
Pinckney and gave the President the “power to grant pardons and
reprieves, except in impeachments.”42 There is no reference to
“offenses” or “crimes” in this first draft. Alexander Hamilton offered
a second version and added “offenses,” thereby giving the President
“the power of pardoning all offences except treason.”43 The final ver-
sion of the Pardon Clause provided that the President “shall have
power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United
States.”44
Nowhere in the drafting history was there any suggestion that the
pardon power is limited to crimes. Indeed, the evidence of Pinckney
and Hamilton’s other proposals to the Constitutional Convention and
outside writings suggest an appreciation of the distinction between
crimes and offenses. Pinckney’s other proposals to the Convention
include language limiting the application of the draft provisions to
“criminal offences” and “felonies.”45 In Hamilton’s outside writings
39 See 4 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 70 (5th ed. 1786). The
Supreme Court has relied upon this treatise as a key source on eighteenth-century law. See,
e.g., PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2579–80 (2011).
40 JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 271; see also THOMAS SHERIDAN, To Pardon, A
COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 1779) (defining “To
Pardon” as “to remit a penalty”).
41 See Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 260 (1974) (explaining that the Framers did not
“devote extended debate to [the] meaning” of the Pardon Clause).
42 5 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN THE
CONVENTION HELD AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 131 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1845)
[hereinafter DEBATES].
43 Id. at 179.
44 Id. at 549. The record, see DEBATES, supra note 42, does not show that this version
included the limiting language “except in cases of impeachment,” but other sources
confirm that the impeachment exception had been added by this time. E.g., ALEX
SIMPSON, JR., A TREATISE ON FEDERAL IMPEACHMENTS 20 (1916).
45 See Messing, supra note 7, at 702–09 (detailing the other Pinckney provisions).
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he also used the word “offences” distinctly and more broadly than
“crimes.”46
In assessing the word choice and drafting history of the Pardon
Clause, it is critical to understand that the civil label, in the early years
of the Union, was generally used solely in relation to suits between
private parties (to which the pardon power unquestionably does not
apply) and not in regard to regulatory noncriminal offenses against
the United States. As Justice Frankfurter explained, the denomination
of statutes as either civil or criminal in nature did not begin to take
hold until the mid-nineteenth century.47 Frankfurter listed hundreds
of early statutes penalizing “petty offenses.”48 He demonstrated “the
wholly capricious way in which infractions of the law were sometimes
directed to be enforced by formal criminal prosecutions, and some-
times by civil penalties.”49 As Professor Beth Stephens further
explained:
Civil and criminal proceedings were so intertwined at the time of
the drafting of the Constitution that distinguishing between them in
the historical record presents “[p]articularly thorny” problems.
“Colonial legislatures, like Parliament, made no sharp distinction
between different forms directed to the same end.” . . . Moreover,
nominally civil proceedings could lead to imprisonment for failure
to pay the fine imposed. These early legal proceedings did not dis-
tinguish between civil and criminal proceedings based on either the
identity of the litigator of the action (public official or private cit-
izen) or the form of the sanction (fine paid to the government, fine
paid to a private person, or imprisonment).50
While the dividing line was unclear, there was an acknowledge-
ment at the time that some public offenses were criminal in nature
and others were not. However, there was no specific term of art at the
time of the Founding used to describe noncriminal offenses against
the state. Today we might refer to such noncriminal offenses as
46 See, e.g., Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Comm. of the N.Y. Convention (Apr. 20,
1777) (describing crimes as serious actions and offenses as more trivial in comparison), in 6
THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 574, 574–75 (John C. Hamilton ed., 1851); see
also Messing, supra note 7, at 706 (discussing Hamilton’s use of the two terms).
47 See Felix Frankfurter & Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the
Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917, 937 (1926); see also
Messing, supra note 7, at 687 (explaining that, at the time of the framing, “statutes were
not denominated as either criminal or civil offenses”).
48 See Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 47, at 938–65.
49 See id. at 937 n.91.
50 Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress’s Power to “Define and
Punish . . . Offenses Against the Law of Nations,” 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 511–12
(2000) (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra
note 47, at 937).
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regulatory violations, which we understand to be civil in nature. The
best reading of the history and authority at the time of the Founding is
that “offenses” was a broader category than “crimes” and encom-
passed all public law violations by individuals, including those we
would now categorize as civil regulatory violations. Against this back-
drop, the Framers’ decision to use the broader term “offense” and not
the more limited “crimes” used elsewhere in the Constitution seems
particularly instructive.51
While the text and drafting history strongly suggest that the
Pardon Clause was intended to reach at least some noncriminal
offenses, they are not alone dispositive. To supplement textual anal-
ysis, early historical practice is often relied upon by the Supreme
Court as particularly probative of the Constitution’s meaning.52 Given
that the civil label was not then used to describe offenses against the
state, we will not find examples of pardons for offenses formally
denoted as “civil” during this period. A functional review of early
pardon practice, however, seems to confirm a broad conception of
“offenses” that can be pardoned. A number of presidential pardons
were issued following the framing of the Constitution for what we
would now recognize as civil regulatory offenses. Presidents George
Washington, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson all issued early par-
dons for offenses punished only by fines, not imprisonment, which
resemble in character and substance modern civil offenses.53
51 Whatever one thinks of the general merits of originalism as an interpretive tool, the
Supreme Court has been emphatic in the pardon context that the boundaries of the pardon
power are defined by the original understanding of that power as it was exercised at the
time of the Founding. See discussion infra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
52 See Price, supra note 14, at 717; see, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550,
2553 (2014) (“[I]n interpreting the Clause, the Court puts significant weight upon historical
practice.”); Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1819 (2014) (“[T]he
Establishment Clause must be interpreted ‘by reference to historical practices and
understandings.’” (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 670 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), abrogated by Galloway, 134 S. Ct.
1811)); Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43 (1996) (evaluating a due process claim and
finding “[o]ur primary guide in determining whether the principle in question is
fundamental is, of course, historical practice”); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 718 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Certainly, our decisions reflect the fact that an awareness of
historical practice often can provide a useful guide in interpreting . . . abstract
language . . . .”).
53 See Messing, supra note 7, at 719–21 (citing specific pardons by relying upon a
dataset of pardons compiled by Professor P.S. Ruckman). The authors thank Professor
Ruckman for generously making his database available for the research underlying this
Article as well.
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Early case law also provides examples of pardons for offenses
that would, by contemporary standards, carry the civil label.54 In
United States v. Yeaton, for instance, the Circuit Court for the District
of Columbia considered a presidential pardon that was issued for
remission of a forfeiture order of a boat that had violated an
embargo.55 Critically, the statute under which the forfeiture was
ordered did not provide for the possibility of any incarceration or
other uniquely criminal punishment.56 It was akin to a modern civil
forfeiture statute.57 Nonetheless, there was no dispute as to the power
of the President to remit the portion of the forfeiture due to the gov-
ernment.58 Similarly in Ex parte Marquand, the Circuit Court for the
District of Massachusetts was also called to consider a pardon for an
offense that carried no potential for incarceration or other uniquely
criminal penalty.59 The offense related to underpaid tariffs and was
conducted in civil court under civil procedures.60 Finally, in United
States v. Lancaster, the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held that the President could cancel the government’s
interest in what was, in essence, a qui tam action.61 In none of these
cases did any party or court question the power of the President to
pardon these types of offenses.
These examples, together with the plain language of the
Constitution and drafting history, provide strong support for the
Framers’ understanding that pardons could reach beyond the tradi-
tional criminal realm to offenses which, under modern standards,
would be considered civil.
2. The King of England’s Pardon Power
The Supreme Court has been clear and emphatic that the bound-
aries of the President’s pardon power are coextensive with the bound-
aries of the analogous power enjoyed by the King of England at the
54 See generally Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103, 108, 115 (1909) (demonstrating
how the Court later came to view the types of pardoned offenses described in this and the
prior paragraph as civil).
55 United States v. Yeaton, 2 D.C. (2 Cranch) 73 (1813).
56 See Act of Feb. 28, 1806, Pub. L. 9-9, 2 Stat. 351 (1806) (expired).
57 Cf. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114
Stat. 202 (2000).
58 Yeaton, 2 D.C. (2 Cranch) at 73.
59 Ex parte Marquand, 16 F. Cas. 776, 776–77 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 9100).
60 See id.; see also Messing, supra note 7, at 726.
61 United States v. Lancaster, 26 F. Cas. 859, 860–61 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1821) (No. 15,557);
see also Conn. Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 330 F. Supp. 695, 697 (D. Conn.
1971), aff’d, 457 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1972) (“Recognition of the qui tam right of action appears
to have been confined to lawsuits in which the informer seeks to recover statutory fines or
penalties which are civil in nature.”).
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time of the framing of the Constitution. As the Supreme Court
explained in Ex parte Wells:
[T]he language used in the constitution, conferring the power to
grant reprieves and pardons, must be construed with reference to its
meaning at the time of its adoption. At the time of our separation
from Great Britain, that power had been exercised by the king, as
the chief executive. . . . [W]hen the words to grant pardons were
used in the constitution, they conveyed to the mind the authority as
exercised by the English crown, or by its representatives in the colo-
nies. At that time both Englishmen and Americans attached the
same meaning to the word pardon. In the convention which framed
the constitution, no effort was made to define or change its
meaning, although it was limited in cases of impeachment. We must
then give the word the same meaning as prevailed here and in
England at the time it found a place in the constitution.62
As a result, the Supreme Court has routinely looked to English
pardon practice to determine the boundaries of the President’s pardon
power.63
In evaluating the reach of the King’s pardon power—known as
the King’s prerogative—to civil offenses, we are again faced with the
fact that the civil-criminal divide was not well established, at least in
the realm of public offenses, at the time of the Founding.64 Without
the aid of the formal civil and criminal labels, in order to evaluate the
reach of the King’s pardon power at the Founding, we look to the
general principles that controlled the use of the power and to the
62 Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 311 (1855); see also Burdick v. United States,
236 U.S. 79, 91 (1915) (“The principles declared in Wilson v. United States [pertaining to
the adoption of England’s conception of the pardon power] have endured for years; no
case has reversed or modified them.”); United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 159–60
(1833) (“[W]e adopt [Britain’s] principles respecting the operation and effect of a pardon,
and look into their books for the rules prescribing the manner in which it is to be used by
the person who would avail himself of it.”); cf. Effects of a Presidential Pardon, 19 Op.
O.L.C. 160, 162 (1995) (“The pardon clause of the Constitution was derived from the
pardon power held by the King of England at the adoption of the Constitution.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has repeatedly looked to English cases for guidance in
interpreting the effect of a pardon.”); Power of the President to Remit Fines Against
Defaulting Jurors, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 458, 459 (1845) (“[W]e adopt, as the Supreme Court of
the United States has decided we should do, the principles established by the common law
respecting the operation of a pardon . . . .”).
63 See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 411–13 (1993); Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S.
256, 261–64 (1974) (using the English practice of allowing conditions on grants of pardon
as evidence of the Framers’ incorporation of the practice to the American understanding of
the pardon power); Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 109–10 (1925); Burdick, 236 U.S. at
89; Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 69 (1904); Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450,
453–54 (1892); The Laura, 114 U.S. 411, 416–17 (1885); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
333, 341–42 (1866); Wells, 59 U.S. at 310–11.
64 See discussion supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.
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characteristics of the categories of offenses that were pardonable at
common law. This is the approach that has been employed by the
Supreme Court in evaluating the reach of the pardon power.65
English law drew a line between offenses against the Crown,
which could be pardoned, and private civil matters, which could not.66
Consistent with the broad principle that all offenses against the Crown
were pardonable, there is a long history of Kings pardoning individ-
uals for offenses against the Crown that would be considered civil by
modern standards.67 English Kings routinely issued pardons remitting
fines for what we would now recognize as regulatory violations, like
hunting, land use, tax, and tariff violations.68 While fines can be used
as both criminal and civil penalties, the King’s pardon power reached
all fines payable to the Crown.69 King George III’s pardon practice is,
of course, particularly instructive regarding the conception of the
pardon power at the time of the Founding. He too used pardons to
remit fines for offenses analogous to modern civil regulatory viola-
tions, including gaming and land use violations.70 In Hepner v. United
States, in an era when the civil label for offenses against the state was
65 See, e.g., Reed, 419 U.S. at 263–64; Grossman, 267 U.S. at 111; Wells, 59 U.S. at
310–11.
66 See Grossman, 267 U.S. at 110–11; Power of the President to Remit Fines Against
Defaulting Jurors, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. at 460 (“The King’s right to pardon . . . is confined to
cases in which the prosecution is carried on in his Majesty’s name for the commission of
some offence affecting the public, and which demands public satisfaction, or for the
recovery of a fine or forfeiture to which his Majesty is entitled.” (quoting 13 PETERDORFF’S
ABRIDGMENT *78)); William F. Duker, The President’s Power to Pardon: A Constitutional
History, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475, 526 (1977) (“[I]f a suit was for the king’s branch of
a law only and not to the particular damage of any third party, the king could pardon or
dispense; if the suit was . . . for the king’s benefit . . . [and] profit or safety of a third person,
the king could not release the party.”). This is the source of the axiomatic limitation
recognized in U.S. pardon jurisprudence that pardons may not be used to interfere with
private rights. See also discussion supra note 19 and accompanying text.
67 Messing, supra note 7, at 689–94 (describing how an “unbroken line of kings and
queens pardoned offenses that would almost undoubtedly be civil today” and exhaustively
cataloging pardons for civil-type offenses by English Kings in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries).
68 WILLIAM G. SCROGGINS, LEAVES OF A STUNTED SHRUB 99, 347 (2009); STEPHEN
SEDLEY, LIONS UNDER THE THRONE: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH PUBLIC LAW
139 n.67 (2015); 2 ARTHUR TREVOR, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM THE THIRD, KING
OF ENGLAND AND STADTHOLDER OF HOLLAND 176 (1836) (referring to actions taken by
King William III in 1689); see also 1 LEONARD WOODS LABAREE, ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS
TO BRITISH COLONIAL GOVERNORS 1670–1776, at 330–31 (1935).
69 As one English judge explained during this era, if a “fine . . . came to the king’s
coffers . . . the king might pardon it.” 6 T.B. HOWELL, A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE
TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS
775 (1811); see also WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 553
(6th ed. 1787) (noting that the power of pardon was so extensive as to be “dependent on
the pleasure of the [king]”).
70 HAWKINS, supra note 69, at 541, 543.
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still of relatively new vintage, the Supreme Court had occasion to
grapple with the difficult task of assigning the criminal or civil label to
statutes enacted before that distinction was firmly established.71 The
Court’s analysis in Hepner, finding several statutes analogous to those
pardoned by English Kings to be civil in nature,72 further confirms
that the pardon power, as exercised at the time of the Founding,
extended to civil offenses against the United States.
3. The Supreme Court’s Pardon Jurisprudence
While the Supreme Court has never held that the pardon power
is limited to criminal offenses, in dicta, it has sometimes characterized
the pardon power in ways that seem to assume such a limit.73 At other
times, however, the Court has seemed to recognize broader applica-
tions of the pardon power.74 However, these cases are of limited
utility to the current inquiry because in none of these cases was the
Court actually called upon to consider whether the pardon power
could be applied beyond the criminal realm. There is very limited
Supreme Court precedent discussing the potential application of the
pardon power to noncriminal offenses; however, the cases that do dis-
cuss the issue make clear the power is not strictly limited to the crim-
inal realm.75
Ex parte Grossman is the only case where the Supreme Court was
squarely confronted with the question of whether a presidential
pardon could operate on a noncriminal offense. In Grossman, a dis-
trict court had enjoined Mr. Grossman from selling alcohol, which was
prohibited under federal law at the time.76 Mr. Grossman violated
that order, prompting the district court to hold him in contempt and
71 Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103, 105 (1909).
72 See id. at 105–08 (examining the nature of statutes carrying fines and penalties
without criminal punishment as the dividing line between civil and criminal suits).
73 See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 150 (1833) (“A pardon . . .
exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a
crime he has committed.”).
74 See, e.g., Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 312 (1855) (“Nor can the king
pardon for a common nuisance, because it would take away the means of compelling a
redress of it, unless it be in a case where the fine is to the king, and not a forfeiture to the
party grieved.” (emphasis added)); id. at 311 (“A pardon is said by Lord Coke to be a work
of mercy, whereby the king, either before attainder, sentence, or conviction, or after,
forgiveth any crime, offence, punishment, execution, right, title, debt, or duty, temporal or
ecclesiastical . . . .”); Osborn v. United States, 91 U.S. 474, 478 (1875) (finding that the
President’s constitutional authority to pardon offenses carries with it the power to release
all penalties and forfeitures that accrue from the offenses).
75 See, e.g., Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 115 (1925); The Laura, 114 U.S. 411,
413–14 (1885).
76 Grossman, 267 U.S. at 107.
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sentence him to a period of incarceration.77 Thereafter, the President
issued a pardon commuting Mr. Grossman’s sentence of incarcera-
tion.78 The district court, however, refused to release Mr. Grossman
and ordered instead that he serve the full period of incarceration orig-
inally imposed.79 The district court was explicit in its ruling that it did
so because it believed the President was impotent to pardon a con-
tempt finding.80 In the view of the district court, contempt was not an
“offense” within the meaning of the Pardon Clause, because it was not
a “crime[ ].”81
The Supreme Court ultimately disagreed. The Court held that
“the term ‘offen[se]’” as used in the Pardon Clause is “more compre-
hensive . . . than are the terms ‘crimes’ and ‘criminal prosecutions.’”82
The Court’s analysis was premised on the principle, discussed
above, that the scope of the pardon power was identical to the scope
of the “[k]ing’s prerogative” at the time of the Founding.83 The King’s
prerogative, the Court noted, had extended to analogous contempt
orders because they were offenses against the Crown.84 Unlike a pri-
vate offense between two private parties, which could not be
pardoned, contempt was an offense against the state and was thus
within the King’s power to pardon.85 The Court recognized that par-
dons can undermine the authority of the coordinate branches of
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 United States v. Grossman, 1 F.2d 941, 952–53 (N.D. Ill. 1924).
81 Grossman, 267 U.S. at 108.
82 Id. at 117–18 (citing Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 70 (1904)). The contempt
order in Grossman was technically classified as “criminal” rather than “civil” contempt,
but the Court was clear that it was not criminal in the sense of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments because no right to jury, nor other constitutional criminal procedure
protection, attached. Id. The civil versus criminal distinction in the contempt context rested
on the question of whether the penalty imposed was intended to vindicate the rights of the
state (the dignity of the court) or the rights of a private party. Id. at 113–15. The former
were designated as criminal contempt and the latter as civil contempt. Id. 
83 Id. at 113; see also discussion supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
84 Grossman, 267 U.S. at 111; see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 849 n.6 (1985)
(Marshall, J., concurring) (discussing the tradition of broad discretion given to the
executive in England and America and its relation to private prosecution); Duker, supra
note 66, at 486 (noting the only limitation to the King’s pardon power was a restriction on
acts interfering with the rights of third parties).
85 See Grossman, 267 U.S. at 111 (noting the inefficacy of the King’s pardon in a suit
securing a private party’s rights); Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 312 (1855) (noting
the King’s inability to pardon a common nuisance where the fine is to be paid to a private
party and not the Crown).
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government; however, the Court appeared to view this tension as a
healthy part of the larger system of checks and balances.86
While the Grossman decision was issued nearly a century ago,
modern practice confirms that the holding is still understood as good
law. Indeed, President Trump’s very first pardon was issued in pre-
cisely the same noncriminal context discussed in Grossman. On
August 25, 2017, President Trump issued a pardon to the infamous
Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio.87 Sheriff Arpaio had defied a
federal court order to cease illegally arresting individuals for immigra-
tion violations and, as a result, had been held in contempt.88 Before
sentencing, the pardon was issued. The pardon sparked significant
controversy and some even advanced various theories that it was
unconstitutional.89 But no one challenged the noncriminal nature of
the pardon.
The only other instance in which the Supreme Court had occasion
to consider application of the pardon power outside the criminal
realm was in the case of The Laura.90 The Laura involved a damages
suit brought by a private individual under a statute that permitted
either the government or a private party to sue steamboat operators if
they exceeded their permissible passenger load.91 The statutory action
was unquestionably civil in nature.92 The statute under which that
action was instituted permitted the Secretary of the Treasury to, in his
discretion, absolve any violating carrier of the liability imposed by
statute.93 When the Secretary granted such absolution to the operator
of The Laura, the case was dismissed.94 The original plaintiff,
86 See Grossman, 267 U.S. at 120–21 (discussing the checks and balances between the
branches as foundational to the Constitution); see also Power of the President to Remit
Fines Against Defaulting Jurors, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 458, 461 (1845) (noting the vesting of the
powers of punishment and pardon in separate branches is a deliberate function of the
Constitution).
87 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, EXECUTIVE GRANT OF CLEMENCY TO JOSEPH M.
ARPAIO (Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/pardon/file/993586/download.
88 See Davis & Haberman, supra note 7.
89 See Dahlia Lithwick, Was Trump’s Pardon of Joe Arpaio Unconstitutional?, SLATE
(Sept. 15, 2017), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/09/
was_trump_s_pardon_of_joe_arpaio_unconstitutional.html (detailing various
constitutional objections to the pardon).
90 The Laura, 114 U.S. 411 (1885).
91 Id. at 411–12.
92 The statute at issue in The Laura was a qui tam statute, giving private individuals the
right to stand in the shoes of the government and sue for damages. See Walker v. Globe
Newspaper Co., 140 F. 305, 309 (1st Cir. 1905), rev’d on other grounds, 210 U.S. 356 (1908)
(referencing the “qui tam” nature of the statute at issue in The Laura). Such qui tam
actions are civil in nature. See Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 252 F.3d 749, 757 (5th
Cir. 2001) (noting the “civil context in which qui tam suits are pursued”).
93 The Laura, 114 U.S. at 412–13.
94 Id. at 413.
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however, appealed.95 He argued that the provision of law allowing the
Secretary of the Treasury to grant absolution was unconstitutional
because the Pardon Clause granted that right exclusively to the
President.96 Ultimately, the Court rejected the appeal and held that
the power to forgive individuals for offenses against the United States
was not exclusive to the President and, thus, Congress too could grant
such relief.97 Notably, however, the Court apparently accepted
without controversy that the President’s pardon power would permit
the President to absolve the carrier of civil liability for the cause of
action held by the United States.98 Accordingly, the Court in The
Laura appeared to view the Pardon Clause as empowering the
President to pardon civil violations against the United States.
Thus, the Supreme Court squarely held in Grossman that the
pardon power could be used in the context of noncriminal offenses
against the federal government and that holding has been consistent
with contemporary practice. Insofar as the analysis in Grossman
turned in part on the particular history of the pardon power in the
contempt context, Grossman does not go so far as to conclusively
establish that the pardon power applies to all civil offenses against the
United States. But the Grossman holding, which remains good law
and has been cited by the Court with approval in recent decades,99
forecloses any conception of the Pardon Clause as limited only to
criminal offenses. Grossman does not resolve, however, whether con-
tempt is a sui generis noncriminal application of the pardon power or
whether contempt fits within a broader category of noncriminal appli-
cations of the Pardon Clause. The Laura did not involve the contempt
context and thus supports a broader reading of the clause as generally
applicable to a larger category of civil offenses against the United
States, though the Court was not called upon in The Laura to rule
directly upon this issue.
Accordingly, the plain language of the Pardon Clause, its drafting
history, the lack of an established criminal-civil divide among public
offenses at the Founding, and the Supreme Court’s Pardon Clause
jurisprudence collectively establish that the pardon power is likely not
limited to the criminal context. The English pardon practice at the
time of the framing, which the Supreme Court has held defines the
boundaries of the presidential pardon power, goes a step further and
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 414–15.
98 See id. at 413–14.
99 See, e.g., Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 266 (1974).
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strongly suggests that the power can be utilized in at least some civil
regulatory contexts.
B. Limitations of the Civil Pardon Power
The foregoing demonstrates that the pardon power is not limited
to the criminal context, but how far into the civil realm does it permit
the President to reach? That question is difficult, particularly given
the birth and vast expansion of the modern regulatory state, which
encompasses areas of civil regulation beyond what the Framers could
have envisioned and beyond the realms in which the pardon power
was exercised in the Founding era. This Article does not endeavor to
establish an absolute line between which civil provisions can and
cannot be pardoned, but, as is explained below, modern jurisprudence
and Office of Legal Counsel opinions that distinguish between civil
penalties and civil regulatory qualifications suggest an important lim-
iting principle. Put briefly, the principle is that, since contemporary
pardon law makes clear that criminal pardons can protect against a
civil penalty, so too should the President be able to pardon such civil
penalty directly (at least insofar as the provision is federal and thus
constitutes an “offence against the United States”). But, since the
President’s pardon power cannot protect against the application of a
civil regulatory qualification or requirement, the pardon power’s
reach into the civil realm should be limited by the same distinction.
Thus, for example, a President could not pardon normal tax liability
because it is an obligation not intended as a penalty, but could pardon
a civil penalty imposed for failure to make a tax payment in a timely
manner. This ability to pardon a civil offense is consistent with the
general principle that the greater power to issue full and uncondi-
tional pardons encompasses the lesser power to commute only some
portion of the penalty that flows from an offense.100
Early American case law established the principle—which has
endured—that consequences which flow automatically from the fact
of a conviction are generally penalties and therefore eliminated by the
issuance of a presidential pardon. In Boyd v. United States, for
example, the Supreme Court found that a pardon issued by President
Harrison restored the competency of the pardoned witness to testify,
explaining that, because “[t]he disability to testify” was “a conse-
quence, according to the principles of the common law, of the
100 See, e.g., Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Grants Commutations and
Pardons, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 17, 2017), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2017/01/17/president-obama-grants-commutations-and-pardons (stating that the
“[d]eath sentence [of Arboleda A. Ortiz was] commuted to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole”).
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judgment of conviction, the pardon obliterated that effect.”101 Simi-
larly, in Osborn v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the pen-
alty of forfeiture, which was directly triggered by conviction for the
pardoned offense, “must fall with the pardon of the offence itself.”102
This understanding of a pardon’s impact is consistent with English
common law, in which it was well settled that a “pardon by the king
removed not only the punishment that flowed from the offense, but
also ‘all the legal disabilities consequent on the crime.’”103
At points in the nineteenth century, it appeared that the Supreme
Court endorsed a broader pardon power, in large part because of lan-
guage in Ex parte Garland and Knote v. United States, a pair of deci-
sions issued in the aftermath of the Civil War suggesting that a pardon
could essentially erase the fact of prior misconduct from a person’s
history.104 In those opinions, the Supreme Court used sweeping lan-
guage to describe the effect of a pardon, stating that it “blots out the
offence,” releases an offender “from the consequences”105 of his
action, and makes the offender a “new man.”106 However, this lan-
guage from Garland and Knote has “not been applied literally” by
lower courts nor repeated by the Supreme Court.107 Instead, courts,
including the Supreme Court, have continued to consistently describe
pardons as reaching “punishments, penalties, and disabilities” that are
triggered by commission of the underlying offense.108
101 Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450, 453–54 (1892).
102 Osborn v. United States, 91 U.S. 474, 477 (1875).
103 Effects of a Presidential Pardon, 19 Op. O.L.C. 160, 162 (1995) (quoting 7 MATTHEW
BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 416 (1852)); see, e.g., Cuddington v. Wilkins
(1615) 80 Eng. Rep. 231, 232 (KB) (“[T]he King’s pardon doth not only clear the offence it
self, but all the dependencies, penalties, and disabilities incident unto it . . . .”).
104 Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 153 (1877); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
333, 380–81 (1866).
105 Knote, 95 U.S. at 153.
106 Garland, 71 U.S. at 380–81.
107 Whether a Presidential Pardon Expunges Judicial and Executive Branch Records of
a Crime, 30 Op. O.L.C. 104, 108 (2006) (citing Memorandum from Norbert Schlei,
Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Andrew Oehmann, Exec. Assistant to the
Att’y Gen., Re: Effect of Pardon on Disability to Hold Federal Office (Aug. 12, 1963)). On
the contrary, subsequent Supreme Court decisions have indicated that it may no longer
subscribe to this view, see, e.g., Carlesi v. New York, 233 U.S. 51, 59 (1914), and some have
suggested that the language in Garland and Knote was merely dicta. See, e.g., In re North,
62 F.3d 1434, 1436–37 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding that the Garland Court “did not rest its
judgment on the theory that the pardon blotted out Garland’s guilt” and noting that, since
its decision rested on the fact that the disability was punitive, the expansive language on
the effect of a pardon “turned out to be dictum”); see also Effect of Presidential Pardon on
Aliens Who Left the Country to Avoid Military Service, 1 Op. O.L.C. 34, 38 (1977) (noting
that “Ex parte Garland may itself be viewed as a case in which the disability actually was
imposed as a penalty”).
108 Effects of a Presidential Pardon, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 166.
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In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, courts have sharpened
the principle that presidential pardons alleviate only punishments,
penalties, and disabilities for commission of an offense against the
United States—as opposed to every consequence flowing from the
underlying facts.109 Although “the Supreme Court has never expressly
adopted a distinction between penalties that a pardon can remove and
qualifications that a pardon does not affect,”110 courts and the execu-
tive branch have generally coalesced around the principle that par-
dons do not erase the fact that an individual committed an offense: As
such, an individual whose past misconduct makes them unable to sat-
isfy some type of qualification, such as meeting certain character
requirements, is not helped by a pardon.111 For example, a pardon for
desertion did not eliminate the fact that a military officer previously
abandoned his unit for purposes of the military’s assessment of the
pardoned individual’s faithful service record when he sought to reen-
list in the armed forces.112 The statute imposing the faithful service
requirement was, importantly, considered to impose a personal char-
acter requirement upon applicants for reenlistment rather than a pen-
alty or disability triggered by the applicant’s commission of an
109 In 1915, Professor Samuel Williston wrote a seminal article on the issue that was
explicitly endorsed by many courts making this distinction. Samuel Williston, Does a
Pardon Blot Out Guilt?, 28 HARV. L. REV. 647, 653 (1915); see, e.g., United States v.
Noonan, 906 F.2d 952, 958–59 (3d Cir. 1990); Bjerkan v. United States, 529 F.2d 125, 128
n.2 (7th Cir. 1975).
110 Effects of a Presidential Pardon, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 163.
111 See, e.g., Noonan, 906 F.2d at 960 (holding that the President’s pardon “does not
eliminate [the] conviction and does not ‘create any factual fiction’ that Noonan’s
conviction had not occurred to justify expunction of his criminal court record”); Effect of
Presidential Pardon on Aliens Who Left the Country to Avoid Military Service, 1 Op.
O.L.C. at 38 (collecting Attorney General opinions); Naval Service—Desertion—Pardon,
31 Op. Att’y Gen. 225, 230 (1918) (stating that the statute in question “is properly to be
regarded as a rule relating to qualification[s] for office,” and “does not impose a penalty as
such on individual offenders,” and that “the incidental disabilities which they may suffer by
reason of the statute are not removed by a pardon”); see also Effect of Presidential Pardon
on Aliens Who Left the Country to Avoid Military Service, 1 Op. O.L.C. at 38 (noting that
Garland may be harmonized with extant law on the scope of the pardon power if viewed as
a case in which the disability was not about a qualification, but in fact a penalty); Williston,
supra note 109, at 647 n.1 (noting that in an opinion issued the day before Garland was
decided, the Supreme Court used a description of the pardon power that remains accurate
to this day: “A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the
execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the
punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed” (quoting United States v.
Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833)).
112 See Effects of a Presidential Pardon, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 163 (describing earlier Office
of Legal Counsel (OLC) opinions holding that a pardon for desertion did not relieve a
military deserter of the provisions requiring “honest and faithful” service in a prior term as
a prerequisite for reenlistment).
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offense.113 Accordingly, the pardoned individual could be denied
reenlistment because, notwithstanding the pardon, it remained true
that his past service had not been faithful, making him unable to meet
the character requirement. Instead, courts determine whether a conse-
quence of a past prohibited act can be eliminated by a pardon by
asking whether the consequences are intended to be punitive or disa-
bling, focusing in particular on whether the consequence attaches
solely because of the violation of federal law.114 For example, pardons
eliminate additional penalties that flow automatically from a convic-
tion, like the deprivation of the right to vote,115 serve on juries,116
work in certain professions,117 testify in court,118 and own firearms,119
but pardons do not permit a person to, for example, satisfy nonpuni-
tive character requirements that their criminal conduct prevents them
from establishing.120 Consistent with this approach, the executive
branch has concluded that a statute that made a person deportable
because of a firearm-related conviction imposed a penalty that would
be eliminated if the firearm offense was pardoned, and indicated that
other civil penalties that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
113 See id.; see also Army—Enlistment—Pardon, 22 Op. Att’y Gen. 36, 39 (1898).
114 See Effects of a Presidential Pardon, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 162; Naval Service—
Desertion—Pardon, 31 Op. Att’y Gen. at 229 (citing Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 277, 319 (1866)); see also Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866).
115 See, e.g., In re North, 62 F.3d 1434, 1439 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Sneed, J., dissenting);
Bjerkan v. United States, 529 F.2d 125, 128 (7th Cir. 1975); In re Exec. Comm’n, 14 Fla.
318 (1872); Cowan v. Prowse, 19 S.W. 407, 411 (Ky. 1892); Wood v. Fitzgerald, 3 Or. 568,
577 (1870); see also Williston, supra note 109, at 654 n.25 (collecting cases).
116 See, e.g., Bjerkan, 529 F.2d at 128; see also United States v. Horodner, 91 F.3d 1317,
1319 n.2 (9th Cir. 1996).
117 See, e.g., Bjerkan, 529 F.2d at 128.
118 See, e.g., Thompson v. United States, 202 F. 401, 407 (9th Cir. 1913) (“The pardons
were full and complete, and their effect in law was to remove penalties and disabilities and
restore the witness to his full rights.”); Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450, 453–54 (1892).
119 See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 60–61 (1980).
120 See, e.g., Hirschberg v. Commodities Future Trading Comm’n, 414 F.3d 679, 683–84
(7th Cir. 2005) (upholding denial of floor broker registration because the fraudulent
conduct underlying a pardoned criminal conviction simply prevented the individual from
fulfilling a nonpunitive qualification for the licensed position). Further, courts have
recognized that even consequences that purport to be disqualifications rather than
penalties will be eliminated by a pardon if they are obviously intended to inflict
punishment for a past act or to add to the punishment of an offender who has been
pardoned. Compare SEC v. Lewis, 423 F. Supp. 2d 337, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (removing the
bar imposed by the SEC on a broker convicted of securities fraud against the association
after the broker received a pardon because according to the court, the permanent bar
functioned as a form of “continued punishment”), with Hirschberg, 414 F.3d at 683–84
(upholding denial of floor broker registration because the fraudulent conduct underlying a
pardoned criminal conviction simply prevented the individual from fulfilling a nonpunitive
qualification for the licensed position).
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imposes for pardoned misconduct can be eliminated by a pardon as
well.121
Through adherence to this rule, courts have circumscribed the
reach of pardons to negative consequences that flow directly from the
commission of an offense against the United States. While questions
about the reach of pardons continue to emerge, the case law on these
issues reflects the separation-of-powers concerns underlying the pen-
alties-versus-qualifications rule.122 For example, in the seminal case on
the implications of the theory that a pardon “blots out” the existence
of an offense for the other coordinate branches, the Third Circuit
explained: The executive “may give what is his own, that is his protec-
tion, which the outlawed person has lost through his flight and contu-
macy, but that which is another’s he cannot give by his own grace.”123
Thus, the distinction that has emerged through time has functioned to
circumscribe the executive’s powers, which makes it a particularly
appealing approach for limiting civil pardons.
The fact that civil penalties may be removed as a result of a
pardon for a criminal offense does not alone necessarily establish that
such penalties can be directly pardoned. However, it would be odd to
construe the pardon power to grant Presidents the authority to issue
limited pardons, protecting an individual from civil penalties that flow
from a crime (which is unquestionably within the pardon power), but
to leave them impotent to pardon precisely the same civil penalty trig-
gered by noncriminal conduct. Indeed, given the textual, historical,
and jurisprudential support for civil pardons,124 the modern distinc-
tion between civil penalties and civil regulatory qualifications offers
an important limiting principle for the use of civil pardons, and one
rooted in centuries of history and jurisprudence on the reach of presi-
dential pardons. Under this logic, pardonable civil “offenses against
the United States” would be limited to civil regulatory offenses that
impose a penalty. Civil regulatory qualifications, which are not
intended to penalize an individual but rather to ensure an individual is
appropriately qualified for the benefit sought, would not be “offenses
against the United States” and thus would not be pardonable. This
approach serves to confine the instances in which pardons can be used
121 See, e.g., Effects of a Presidential Pardon, 19 Op. O.L.C. 160, 162 (1995); see also
infra Part III.
122 See, e.g., In re North, 62 F.3d 1434, 1434, 1438 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v.
Noonan, 906 F.2d 952, 956 (3d Cir. 1990).
123 Noonan, 906 F.2d at 956 (quoting 2 HENRICI DE BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET
CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE 371 (Travers Twiss ed. & trans. 1880) (1257)); see also
Williston, supra note 109, at 649 (quoting Bracton on the same point).
124 See discussion supra Section II.A.
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and minimize any concern, discussed in greater depth in Part IV, that
civil pardons would encroach upon the legislature’s authority.
III
PRESIDENT’S PARDON POWER ENCOMPASSES THE POWER
TO PARDON CIVIL IMMIGRATION OFFENSES
In this Part, we consider which civil immigration violations, if any,
are the type of civil penalties that pardons have traditionally protected
against, and therefore fall within the scope of the pardon power as we
conceive it. Immigration law is a notoriously complex maze of
hypertechnical provisions including both qualifications for obtaining
different forms of lawful immigration status, as well as a variety of
penalties that prevent people from obtaining status or strip them of
it.125 Thus, recognizing the distinction between qualifications, which
should not be pardonable, and penalties, which can be pardoned,
raises the question of which provisions of the INA impose penalties
and which merely set forth necessary qualifications.
This question is somewhat challenging, however, because the
INA’s qualification and penalty provisions are diverse and not neces-
sarily straightforward. They include provisions that penalize non-
citizens (even those with lawful immigration status) for various kinds
of past acts.126 For example, as discussed below, a conviction for cer-
tain crimes can trigger the penalty of deportation.127 However, other
provisions of the INA impose forward-looking regulatory qualifica-
tions. For example, the INA prohibits the admission of certain nonci-
tizens on health-related grounds.128 Presumably, these provisions are
not intended to penalize immigrants for their health-related misfor-
tune but are instead forward-looking qualifications for admission to
determine the desirability, in the eyes of Congress, of their admission
into the United States.
125 See, e.g., Drax v. Reno, 338 F.3d 98, 99 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting the “labyrinthine
character of modern immigration law,” which is “a maze of hyper-technical statutes and
regulations”); Castro-O’Ryan v. INS, 847 F.2d 1307, 1312 (9th Cir. 1988) (describing
immigration law as “second only to the Internal Revenue Code in complexity” (quoting
ELIZABETH HULL, WITHOUT JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF ALIENS
107 (1985))).
126 See generally Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)
(2012).
127 See generally id. § 1227(a)(2). We emphasize that pardoning the violation of the INA
(i.e., the offense of violating federal immigration law) need not and would not pardon the
underlying conviction, which is often—but not always—the incurring of a state criminal
conviction. If the President pardoned the violation of INA in such instances, the criminal
conviction would remain intact; only the offense of violating our civil immigration law
would be pardoned.
128 See generally id. § 1182(a)(1).
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While there are many provisions of the INA worth analyzing to
determine if they are pardonable, we focus here on the two sets of
consequences imposed by the INA that, if eliminated by operation of
a pardon, would have perhaps the greatest effect on the population of
noncitizens who are longtime residents of the United States: those
consequences affecting lawful permanent residents, who are subject to
deportation because of criminal convictions, and those affecting
noncitizens, who entered the United States without authorization and
lack lawful immigration status.129
A. Lawful Permanent Residents with Criminal Convictions
Section 237(a)(2) of the INA provides that lawful permanent
residents—even those who have lived in the United States for
decades—are deportable if they have been convicted of one or more
of a broad range of criminal offenses. Deportation has long been con-
sidered civil in nature,130 and its penal nature is not explicit in the text
of INA § 237(a)(2), which states that, if an individual has been con-
victed of certain categories of offenses, the individual “is deport-
able.”131 Even so, the history, purpose, and effect of deportation leave
no doubt that deportation is a penalty—and therefore, under the
approach described in Section II.B, that the violation of INA
§ 237(a)(2) constitutes an “offense” within the meaning of the pardon
power.
Historically, deportation—in early years, “transportation”—was
not only a penalty, but also a punishment which was directly imposed
as the result of criminal convictions, and which could unquestionably
be eliminated by an executive pardon. At the time of the Founding,
the only mechanism by which individuals were expelled from a nation
was transportation, typically imposed as the result of conviction
for a crime.132 This practice evolved in England from the ancient
129 See Robert Warren, Zero Undocumented Population Growth Is Here to Stay and
Immigration Reform Would Preserve and Extend These Gains, 5 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM.
SECURITY 491, 504 (2017) (stating that the population of individuals who entered without
inspection was estimated at approximately six million in 2015); Muzaffar Chishti &
Michelle Mittelstadt, Unauthorized Immigrants with Criminal Convictions: Who Might Be a
Priority for Removal?, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Nov. 2016), http://
www.migrationpolicy.org/news/unauthorized-immigrants-criminal-convictions-who-might-
be-priority-removal (describing how approximately one million noncitizens with legal
status are potentially deportable as a result of a qualifying crime).
130 See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010); Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893).
131 INA § 237(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2012).
132 See Javier Bleichmar, Deportation as Punishment: A Historical Analysis of the British
Practice of Banishment and Its Impact on Modern Constitutional Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 115, 129 (1999); Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated
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punishment of banishment133 and was a form of criminal punishment
whereby people would be sentenced to indentured servitude in the
colonies or merely banished thereto.134 During the eighteenth century,
as a result of the Transportation Act of 1718, transportation became
the most common form of punishment in felony cases in England.135
In fact, aside from death, it was the only significant form of punish-
ment used at the time.136 Between the passage of the Transportation
Act in 1718 and the end of transportation to the Americas in 1775,
one-quarter of all British immigrants to America, approximately
50,000 people, were sent here as a result of being sentenced to trans-
portation as punishment for a crime.137 Clearly, as a historical matter,
the precursor to deportation was transportation, which was penal in
nature.
Transportation was a well-recognized penalty, and it was
pardoned with some regularity. During this period, transportation was
sometimes imposed directly as a sentence for a crime, and at other
times was a condition of having a death sentence commuted.138 The
historical record demonstrates that not only was the King’s pardon
power able to relieve people of a sentence of transportation, but in
fact such pardons were regularly granted.139 A recent comprehensive
study of individuals sentenced to transportation in England during
one period around the time of the framing of the Constitution
Approach to Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 289, 320–27 (2008); see also United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 269–70
(1905) (noting that both “transportation” and “deportation” refer to the banishment or
“forcible removal of a citizen from his country”).
133 See Wm. Garth Snider, Banishment: The History of Its Use and a Proposal for Its
Abolition Under the First Amendment, 24 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT
455, 459–61 (1998) (citing examples of banishment as a criminal punishment in various
societies dating back to 2285 B.C.).
134 See W.F. Craies, The Compulsion of Subjects to Leave the Realm, 6 L.Q. REV. 388,
396 (1890).
135 Some scholars estimate that as many as seventy percent of felons in London were
sentenced to transportation during the height of its use in the eighteenth century.
Bleichmar, supra note 132, at 126.
136 See id. at 121.
137 Id. at 127.
138 See 1734, 7 Geo. 2, c. 21 (Gr. Brit.); 1768, 8 Geo. 3, c. 16 (Gr. Brit.); D.A. Thomas,
Sentencing in England, 42 MD. L. REV. 90, 108 (1983) (“As a sentence imposed by the
court itself (as opposed to a term of a conditional pardon), transportation became firmly
established by the Transportation Act 1717.”); see also Bruce Kercher, Perish or Prosper:
The Law and Convict Transportation in the British Empire, 1700–1850, 21 LAW & HIST.
REV. 527, 530–31 (2003) (describing transportation as a direct sentence for a crime and as a
condition of the pardoning of a death sentence under the Transportation Act of 1718).
139 Richard Ward & Lucy Williams, Initial Views from the Digital Panopticon:
Reconstructing Penal Outcomes in the 1790s, 34 LAW & HIST. REV. 893, 918–26 (2016)
(surveying circumstances that gave rise to pardons, including in cases of young first-time
offenders).
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demonstrated that over twenty percent of all people sentenced to
transportation were granted pardons protecting them from transporta-
tion.140 Accordingly, the historical record makes clear that the histor-
ical analog of deportation, well known to the Framers, was considered
a penalty and routinely eliminated by pardons.141
The understanding that deportation may be a penalty has carried
through to modern day. Supreme Court jurisprudence has made clear
that deportation, at least when imposed as the result of a criminal con-
viction, is a penalty. In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Court described
deportation for a criminal conviction as “an integral part—indeed,
sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that may be
imposed on noncitizen defendants.”142 Thus, while the Supreme Court
views deportation as civil in nature, Padilla established, and similar
points in the recent Lee v. United States decision reaffirmed, that
deportation, when triggered by criminal convictions, is a form of civil
penalty.143
The executive branch has agreed, and gone further to explicitly
find, that the penalty of deportation can be alleviated by a pardon. In
a 1995 opinion, the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC) concluded that “a deportation order . . . is a consequence of a
conviction that is precluded by a full and unconditional presidential
pardon” because it is “an additional penalty.”144 In so opining, it
140 Id. at 919. This study’s dataset involved individuals sentenced to transportation from
England to Australia, not America; however, it nevertheless clearly demonstrates that the
King’s pardon power extended over sentences of transportation. Id. at 918–26. Other
accounts confirm that pardons were exercised over transportation sentences to America.
See Ashley T. Rubin, The Unintended Consequences of Penal Reform: A Case Study of
Penal Transportation in Eighteenth-Century London, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 815, 820
(2012) (explaining that between 1718 and 1775, the height of transportation to America,
“[m]any” people were “sentenced to be transported but escaped their sentence, often by a
conditional or full pardon”). There are also accounts of individual pardon processes for
persons ordered transported during the period of American transportation. See Folio 32:
Petition of Thomas Love, Sentenced to Transportation for Theft, for a Pardon, U.K. NAT’L
ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C7764898 (last visited Aug. 9,
2017); Folio 123: Certificate of Justice T [Thomas] Denison. Recommending Mary Malin for
a Free Pardon, U.K. NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/
C16108401 (last visited Aug. 9, 2017).
141 See Effect of Presidential Pardon on Aliens Who Left the Country to Avoid Military
Service, 1 Op. O.L.C. 34, 39 (1977) (opining that a pardon protects against punitive
exclusion grounds, in part because “[e]xclusion from the United States . . . is analogous to
the devices of banishment and exile that ‘have throughout history been used as
punishment’” (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 n.23 (1963))).
142 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364 (2010).
143 Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1967–68 (2017); Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364; see
also Markowitz, supra note 132, at 330–41 (concluding that, under factors articulated in
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168–69, deportation proceedings are punitive in nature).
144 Effects of a Presidential Pardon, 19 Op. O.L.C. 160, 162 (1995); see also Matter of
Rahman, 16 I. & N. Dec. 579, 580 (B.I.A. 1978) (terminating removal proceedings based
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considered the question of whether deportability due to a criminal
conviction is “a penalty or disability based on an offense [or] rather
only implements a decision regarding conduct Congress has deemed
inconsistent with the qualifications aliens must have to remain in the
country.”145 The OLC noted that deportation is not traditionally seen
as punishment for purposes of other constitutional provisions, but ulti-
mately found it clear that even under the narrower modern view of
the consequences that pardons eliminate, deportability is “the type of
consequence that is removed by a pardon.”146 Records from the
Office of the Pardon Attorney demonstrate that it has long agreed, as
it has issued a number of pardons for the explicit purpose of
preventing deportation.147 Moreover, in what appears to be the only
OLC opinion to consider this issue, the OLC has suggested that the
President could pardon punitive civil immigration consequences
directly.148
Thus, considered in light of contemporary conceptions of the
pardon power, it seems clear that the deportability that results when a
noncitizen violates § 237(a)(2), which provides that individuals who
incur certain criminal convictions are essentially “guilty” of a civil vio-
lation under the INA, is a penalty, and therefore a civil offense that
may be directly absolved through a pardon. This distinction—between
being able to directly pardon the provisions of § 237(a)(2) as opposed
to only being able to use a criminal pardon to remove the penalties
imposed by § 237(a)(2)—is critical because, as discussed above in Part
I, the vast majority of individuals subject to deportation pursuant to
§ 237(a)(2) find themselves in deportation proceedings as the result of
state criminal convictions. Because the President cannot pardon state
convictions (just as a governor cannot pardon a federal offense), the
only way that individuals facing deportation because of state convic-
tions can be protected from deportation is through a pardon like the
upon a presidential pardon); Matter of M—, 3 I. & N. Dec. 310, 322 (B.I.A. 1950)
(terminating deportation proceedings after the respondent was granted a presidential
pardon for his violation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act); Effect of Presidential
Pardon on Aliens Who Left the Country to Avoid Military Service, 1 Op. O.L.C. at 39 n. 10
(discussing OLC’s suggestion that the President could directly pardon punitive civil
removal provisions).
145 Effects of a Presidential Pardon, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 163.
146 Id. at 164.
147 See W.H. HUMBERT, THE PARDONING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT 131 (1941)
(surveying stated reasons for each pardon issued between 1885 and 1905 and finding
seventeen pardons issued to prevent deportation between 1928 and 1931).
148 Effect of Presidential Pardon on Aliens Who Left the Country to Avoid Military
Service, 1 Op. O.L.C. at 35, 39 n.10 (considering whether the provision mandating
inadmissibility could be pardoned). This opinion is discussed in greater detail in Section
III.B, infra.
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one we discuss here: one that can operate directly against the federal
deportation offense.
B. Undocumented Noncitizens
A more complicated question arises in the case of noncitizens
who lack immigration status at all because the pardon power cannot
immunize a person against prosecution for future violations of the law
or affirmatively grant an individual immigration status.149 Undocu-
mented noncitizens,150 like the lawful permanent residents discussed
above, are removable under the INA.151 Unlike those lawful perma-
nent residents, who are removable because of their convictions,
undocumented noncitizens are removable because they lack authori-
zation to be in the United States.152 As explained above, a pardon can
eliminate the penalty of deportation for a past violation of the INA—
such as a past conviction.153 But this is not enough for undocumented
noncitizens because, unlike lawful permanent residents who would
retain their lawful status if their deportability was pardoned, undocu-
mented noncitizens pardoned for their prior period of unlawful status
will be in unlawful status again the moment after the pardon is issued.
149 See Passenger Laws.—Pardoning Power., 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 393, 403 (1854) (“[I]f a
pardon could be granted in advance for offences to be committed thereafter, it would
include a power to grant indulgences to commit crimes and offences, to license vice, to
dispense with the sanction of the laws, without good motive, without reason, but solely by
arbitrary will . . . . A pardon for an offence not yet committed would be void.”); Ex parte
Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866) (“The [pardon] power thus conferred is
unlimited, with the exception stated. It extends to every offence known to the law, and may
be exercised at any time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are taken, or
during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment.”).
150 Generally speaking, “undocumented” refers to noncitizens who do not have
authorization to be present in the United States and therefore lack lawful immigration
status. This group is largely comprised of people who have entered the country without
authorization and people who had some authorization, such as a visa, but overstayed the
timeline for which their presence was authorized.
151 The INA imposes immigration law sanctions for past prohibited acts (e.g., unlawful
entry to the United States or incurring criminal convictions). These sanctions include
inadmissibility (INA § 212) or deportability (INA § 237(a)). If a person is “inadmissible,”
that means that they will generally be denied admission into the United States and are
barred from certain types of immigration status for which they are otherwise eligible. If a
person is “deportable,” that means that the person may have had lawful status, but they
can be stripped of that lawful status because they have violated the INA in some way. Both
sanctions fall under the larger canopy of removability, introduced with the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, which refers to persons
who can be removed from the United States.
152 INA § 212(a)(6)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A) (2012) (stating that noncitizens
present without being admitted or paroled into the country are removable); id. § 237(a)(3),
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3) (stating that noncitizens who fail to register as required by INA § 265
are deportable).
153 See supra Section III.A.
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In other words, even if the penalty of removal for being present in the
United States in violation of the INA prior to the pardon was elimi-
nated retrospectively, undocumented individuals would become
removable for this same reason as soon as the pardon was issued
because a pardon cannot affirmatively grant them immigration status,
nor can it immunize them from prosecution for future acts (here,
being in the United States without authorization after the pardon is
issued).154 Thus, pardoning the ground of removability is of little prac-
tical value unless the noncitizen has some way to obtain lawful status
prospectively.
For many undocumented individuals, there are a number of
obstacles to obtaining lawful status. First, they may lack a basis for
obtaining status. For example, they may not have a close familial rela-
tionship with a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident (a “quali-
fying relative”) through whom they can adjust their status to that of a
lawful permanent resident.155 Second, the INA contains myriad other
provisions that may bar an undocumented noncitizen from adjusting
status even if he or she has a qualifying relative who could petition for
them, or has some other basis for obtaining status.156 Some of these
obstacles are simple nonpunitive eligibility criteria that the undocu-
mented individual cannot meet—which in our view cannot be
pardoned—while others are penalties imposed for past misconduct,
which in our view can be pardoned. Below, we focus on two common
obstacles that are particularly important because, if those obstacles
could be eliminated through a pardon, that would render potentially
millions of noncitizens living in the United States eligible to affirma-
tively obtain lawful status.157
154 See supra note 152.
155 Under INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), certain foreign nationals who are, inter alia,
physically present in the United States may obtain permanent resident status. To adjust
under INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), the statute requires that the individual has made a
lawful entry into the United States, is not otherwise inadmissible, makes an application,
and has an immigrant visa immediately available to him or her when they file their
application. Id. While there are other ways that an immigrant visa may be available to a
noncitizen, such a visa is immediately available to a noncitizen who is the “immediate
relative” of a U.S. citizen. INA § 201(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), INA
§ 204(a)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(i). Immediate relatives are spouses (twenty-
one years and older) of U.S. citizens; unmarried sons and daughters (twenty-one years and
older) of U.S. citizens; and the parents of a U.S. citizen who is older than twenty-one. INA
§ 201(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i).
156 See, e.g., INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (setting forth grounds of inadmissibility,
which, absent a waiver, bar noncitizens from adjusting status); INA § 245(c), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255(c) (prohibiting adjustment of status to individuals described in the enumerated
categories).
157 This is because millions of individuals within this population are nearly eligible for
lawful status because they have qualifying relatives through whom they could adjust status,
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First, even noncitizens who have a qualifying relative through
whom they could adjust are often ineligible to adjust because the
adjustment statute, INA § 245(a), requires that, to adjust status
through a qualifying relative, the noncitizen must have been
“inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States.” This
means that anyone who entered the United States without authoriza-
tion is ineligible to adjust their status. Second—and relatedly—this
same group is barred from adjustment because they are “inadmis-
sible,” which is a consequence that the INA imposes for a variety of
past acts, including unlawful entry, and which bars individuals from
obtaining different types of immigration benefits such as adjustment
of status. Their entry into the United States without inspection trig-
gers the ground of inadmissibility set forth at INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i),
which provides that, as a general matter, “[a]n alien present in the
United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the
United States at any time or place other than as designated by the
Attorney General, is inadmissible.”158 Thus, § 245(a) and
§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i) both operate to prevent many otherwise eligible
noncitizens from adjusting status, although in slightly different ways.
To determine whether § 245(a)—requiring that a person be
admitted or paroled into the country to adjust status—and
§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i)—making anyone who entered without being
admitted or paroled inadmissible—are “offences against the United
States” that can be pardoned, we must apply the penalty-versus-quali-
fication test described above159 and determine whether ineligibility to
adjust and inadmissibility are penalties. At first blush, § 245(a)’s
requirement that any status adjustment applicant has been “inspected
and admitted or paroled into the United States” certainly sounds like
a qualification, a straightforward eligibility criteria not unlike the
character qualifications discussed in Section II.B. And, while
§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i) appears to be more akin to a penalty because it
structurally and functionally operates as a bar status and is triggered
but they are unable to do so because of the obstacles discussed below. At a minimum,
more than three million noncitizens living in the United States would fall into this category
based on the estimated number of noncitizens who would have benefitted from the Obama
Administration’s Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent
Residents (DAPA) because they are parents of minor children with U.S. citizenship. Randy
Capps et al., Deferred Action for Unauthorized Immigrant Parents: Analysis of DAPA’s
Potential Effects on Families and Children, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Feb. 2016), http://
www.migrationpolicy.org/research/deferred-action-unauthorized-immigrant-parents-
analysis-dapas-potential-effects-families (estimating that there were 3.3 million people in
this category).
158 INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).
159 See supra Section II.B.
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only by a past prohibited act, one could argue that we should not look
at inadmissibility itself, but rather at the requirement that a person be
affirmatively admissible in order to adjust their status, which could be
simply another qualification that must be satisfied.
While this analysis may initially seem compelling, it has long been
established that this analysis of whether a consequence is a penalty
should not be guided by mere semantics. As early as 1866, the
Supreme Court made clear that the legislature’s characterization of
the penalty as an eligibility requirement should not be taken at face
value and we must instead look at the function and purpose of the
statute creating the consequence to determine whether it imposes a
penalty.160 The OLC has similarly considered the issue to be one
determined by examining the purpose and function of the conse-
quence. In a 1977 opinion considering the impact of a pardon for eva-
sion of military service, for instance, the OLC analyzed the statutory
language, legislative history, and legislative antecedents of the INA’s
provision stating that all noncitizens who left the country to avoid mil-
itary service were inadmissible, and concluded that the provision was
in fact a penalty.161 The OLC considered the fact that some grounds of
inadmissibility “could properly be regarded as establishing qualifica-
tions for entry” but found that the provision at issue there was puni-
tive because it imposed an affirmative restraint, had a corollary
criminal provision that punished the same misconduct, was motivated
by punitive intent, and “its operation promote[d] the traditional aims
of punishment—retribution and deterrence.”162 The OLC ultimately
concluded that the executive order and accompanying proclamation
pardoning individuals who had violated criminal provisions of the Mil-
itary Selective Service Act eliminated the penalty of inadmissibility
that flowed from the same acts (evasion of military service).163
Notably for present purposes, the OLC noted that the pardon
would have the same effect whether it eliminated the penalty of
160 See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380–81 (1866) (finding that eligibility
“qualifications” for admission to the state bar were in fact penalties); Cummings v.
Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 319, 329 (1866); see also Naval Service—Desertion—
Pardon, 31 Op. Att’y Gen. 225, 229 (1918) (“[W]here a statute although purporting to
prescribe qualifications for office has no real relation to that end but is obviously intended
to inflict punishment for a past act or to add to the punishment of an offender who has
been pardoned, the disguise may be penetrated.”).
161 Effect of Presidential Pardon on Aliens Who Left the Country to Avoid Military
Service, 1 Op. O.L.C. 34, 38–39 & n.10 (1977) (examining the ground of inadmissibility in
the INA, 66 Stat. 166 (1952), then codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(22), and considering the
indicia of punitive intent set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 165–66
(1963)).
162 Id. at 38–39.
163 Id. at 37.
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inadmissibility “derivatively” (i.e., because the underlying criminal
offense was pardoned) or directly, and suggested that the President
could pardon the civil offense that imposed inadmissibility itself.164
President Truman also appeared to subscribe to this view, issuing a
general proclamation that pardoned convicted deserters of the penalty
imposed by provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1940: ineligibility for naturalization.165
Ultimately, considering their purpose, function, and effect,
§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and § 245(a) are best understood as penalties. In
determining whether a consequence is a penalty or a qualification,
courts look to the intent and function of the consequence, including
whether it is triggered solely by the misconduct being pardoned.166
Here, inadmissibility under § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and ineligibility to
adjust under § 245(a) are solely triggered by entry without authoriza-
tion and reinforce each other to impose adverse consequences for this
conduct. Preventing a person from obtaining status is an affirmative
disability or restraint that has long been considered a way to punish
the violator and deter others from entering the country,167 and this
164 Id. at 35, 39 n.10.
165 Proclamation No. 3001, 67 Stat. C24, C25 (Dec. 24, 1952) (stating, in the text of the
proclamation, his intent to relieve the beneficiaries of “section 314 and section 349(a)(8) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (66 Stat. 241, 268) . . . [and] sections 306 and
401(a)(g), respectively, of the Nationality Act of 1940”).
166 See supra Section II.B. Even considered under the test articulated in Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168–69, a more demanding test used to determine whether legislation
is punitive such that Sixth Amendment protections are required, the result would be the
same. The Mendoza-Martinez test asks:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it
has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play
only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional
aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to
which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it
may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.
Id.
167 The legislative history of INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2012) evidences this
intent. See S. REP. NO. 85-2133, at 3699 (1958) (explaining that the bill was “carefully
drawn so as not to grant undeserved benefits to the unworthy or undesirable immigrant”
such as “the alien who has entered the United States in violation of the law”); see also S.
REP. NO. 103-309, at 134 (1994) (concluding that the requirement that unauthorized aliens
obtain visas abroad before adjusting status was “originally designed to dissuade aliens from
circumventing normal visa requirements” through an “intended deterrent effect”); Marisa
S. Cianciarulo, Seventeen Years Since the Sunset: The Expiration of 245(i) and Its Effect on
U.S. Citizens Married to Undocumented Immigrants, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 451, 465 (2015)
(finding the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 was
“predicated on the theory that undocumented immigrants respond to deterrence and
punitive measures”).
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same act is also punished criminally.168 Indeed, in contrast to, for
example, § 245(a)’s nonpunitive requirement that an adjustment
applicant have a qualifying relative, submit an application, or pay the
application fee, the adverse consequence that flows from unautho-
rized entry was the very purpose of § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and § 245(a): to
penalize those who entered unlawfully and deter future violations.169
For example, as Representative Tate bluntly stated:
I am introducing legislation today to put an end to this madness.
Under my bill, if an individual breaks our immigration laws by
intentionally entering the United States illegally, he or she will
never again be eligible for any kind of temporary or immigrant visa.
Not 1 year later, not 20 years later, never.170
In sum, although the bar to adjustment set forth in § 245(a) (and
to a lesser extent the inadmissibility ground set forth in
§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i)) may look like an eligibility requirement, the pur-
pose of both provisions appears to be to penalize noncitizens who
have entered the United States in violation of the INA. Thus these
provisions, like INA § 237(a)(2), impose penalties for the violation of
the provision and therefore, under the limiting principle described
above, set forth offenses within the meaning of the Pardon Clause. As
such, these offenses can be pardoned directly and, with the penalties
they impose eliminated, otherwise eligible noncitizens who committed
the offenses described in § 245(a) and § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) would no
longer be barred from adjusting their status to that of a lawful perma-
nent resident. Put differently, the pardon would open a pathway to
status for a potentially large number of undocumented individuals
who are currently barred from adjusting as a consequence of their vio-
lation of § 245(a) and § 212(a)(6)(A)(i).
We note, somewhat separately, that because the bars to entry
posed by § 245(a) and § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) are penalties, it is possible
that they could be eliminated derivatively through a more traditional
pardon for a crime: “entry by [an] alien” at “[i]mproper time or place”
under INA § 275(a), which applies to “[a]ny alien who (1) enters or
168 This offense, unlawful entry, is a federal misdemeanor. INA § 275, 8 U.S.C. § 1325
(2012) (criminalizing “[i]mproper entry by alien”).
169 See S. REP. NO. 85-2133, at 3699. The legislative materials that explicitly discuss
§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i) similarly evince an intent to create an admissibility regime that penalizes
unlawful entry. See Full Committee Markup: Immigration Overhaul: Hearing on H.R. 2202
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Rep. Lamar
Smith), 1995 WL 596894; see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, pt. I, at 226 (1996) (“Under the
new ‘admission’ doctrine, such aliens will not be considered to have been admitted, and
thus, must be subject to a ground of inadmissibility, rather than a ground of deportation,
based on their presence without admission.”).
170 142 CONG. REC. E85-01 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1996) (statement of Rep. Tate).
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attempts to enter the United States at any time or place other than as
designated by immigration officers, or (2) eludes examination or
inspection by immigration officers.”171 If this criminal offense, which
is based on entering without authorization, was pardoned, civil penal-
ties, such as inadmissibility, that flow from the unlawful entry would
be eliminated.172 Thus, while the question of which criminal pardons
might alleviate certain civil immigration penalties is not the focus of
this Article, we note that it may be possible to use criminal pardons in
creative ways to protect immigrants as well.
IV
APPLICATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT’S IMMIGRATION
PARDON POWER
Recognizing that the presidential pardon power extends into the
civil immigration arena, but contains some significant limitations, it is
worth considering the practical applications for this authority. While
the current President is unlikely to use this power in ways favorable to
noncitizens, future Presidents should consider the immigration par-
dons as a mechanism through which they can afford lasting reprieve to
noncitizens who face unduly harsh penalties for certain violations of
the INA. This Part describes how a President can use this type of
pardon to grant individual or broad-based relief and considers the
question of whether using this power to alleviate the effects of duly
enacted laws conflicts with our constitutional structure.
A. Individual and Categorical Immigration Pardons
The most straightforward manner of exercising this authority is,
of course, through granting individual pardons to people who apply.
This method of issuing pardons is typically done after a review of an
applicant’s individual circumstances and the facts of the underlying
offense, and consideration of the consequences that a person would
face if pardoned vel non.173 Since 1865, a formal administrative struc-
ture for considering individual applications was established, and this
171 INA § 275, 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2012).
172 See supra Section II.B and notes 163–66 (describing the OLC’s conclusion that the
inadmissibility that was triggered by a criminal violation of the Military Selective Service
Act was eliminated derivatively when the criminal violation of the Act was pardoned).
173 See Samuel T. Morison, The Politics of Grace: On the Moral Justification of
Executive Clemency, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 35–42 (2005) (describing the process by
which the Office of the Pardon Attorney reviews individual clemency applications);
Lauren Schorr, Note, Breaking into the Pardon Power: Congress and the Office of the
Pardon Attorney, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1535, 1544 (2009) (same).
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model has historically been the primary mechanism for issuing presi-
dential pardons.174
Presidents can also exercise the pardon power categorically,
without individual applications or review, and, though it is less
common, have done so throughout our nation’s history. In fact, over
one-third of past Presidents have issued collective and large-scale par-
dons (sometimes referred to as “amnesties”),175 generally to restore
politically unpopular subgroups to the national embrace, or otherwise
advance the national interest.176 Just seven years after the Constitu-
tion was ratified, President Washington pardoned “all persons” guilty
of treasonous offenses “or otherwise concerned in the late insurrec-
tion” now known as the Whiskey Rebellion.177 President Madison
similarly issued a broad pardon to “any person or persons whomso-
ever, being inhabitants of New Orleans and the adjacent country, or
being inhabitants of the said Island of Barataria and the places adja-
cent” who assisted the Navy for “all offenses committed in violation of
any act or acts of the Congress of the said United States touching the
revenue, trade, and navigation thereof, or touching the intercourse
and commerce of the United States with foreign nations.”178
In subsequent years, Presidents issued categorical pardons to
even larger groups of people. During the Civil War, for example,
174 See Morison, supra note 173, at 34–35 (describing the establishment of this
administrative structure); Office of the Pardon Att’y, Clemency Statistics, U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/pardon/clemency-statistics (last visited Aug. 6, 2017) (reporting the
number of individual pardons granted since 1900).
175 Pardons and amnesties are functionally the same for purposes of this discussion. See
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 601 (1896) (“The distinction between amnesty and pardon
is of no practical importance.”); see also Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 152–53 (1877)
(stating that the distinction is of no “legal importance”); Armstrong v. United States, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 154, 155–56 (1871) (recognizing the validity of President Johnson’s
“universal amnesty and pardon for participation in [the] rebellion”); Pardon—Removal of
Disabilities—Pension, 27 Op. Att’y Gen. 178, 181 (1909) (“Nor is the form which this
pardon may assume at all important, or the manner of its promulgation . . . . [W]hether by
a formal pardon directed and delivered to the beneficiary . . . or by a proclamation of
amnesty to a class of offenders, this is always and necessarily an exercise of the pardoning
power . . . .”); Amnesty—Power of the President, 20 Op. Att’y Gen. 330, 337 (1892)
(tracing Supreme Court approbation of general pardons and concluding that President
Harrison had the power to issue a general grant of amnesty to convicted polygamists).
176 These include Presidents Washington, Adams, Jefferson, Madison, Buchanan,
Lincoln, Johnson, Harrison, Cleveland, Roosevelt, Harding, Coolidge, Truman, Kennedy,
Ford, and Carter. See Charles Shanor & Marc Miller, Pardon Us: Systematic Presidential
Pardons, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 139, 139–41 (2001) (discussing the use of systematic pardons
by at least one-third of all U.S. Presidents); infra notes 177–89 and accompanying text
(discussing how several Presidents have used large-scale pardons); see also Office of the
Pardon Att’y, supra note 174 (providing clemency statistics for some of these Presidents).
177 George Washington, Proclamation Granting Pardon to the Western Insurgents (July
10, 1795), reprinted in 20 Op. Att’y Gen. 339, 339–40 (1895).
178 Amnesty—Power of the President, 20 Op. Att’y Gen. at 344.
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President Lincoln issued a broad pardon to people who had partici-
pated in the rebellion,179 and, after the war, President Johnson issued
mass pardons to those who had deserted the army as a way to foster
national unity.180 In 1893 and 1894, Presidents Cleveland and Har-
rison, respectively, pardoned all Mormons who had been convicted of
polygamy—relieving them of the resulting disenfranchisement and
other penalties—in order to quiet the long-simmering hostility
between the federal government and Utah Mormons and smooth the
way for Utah to become a state.181 After World War II, President
Truman issued two broad pardons to individuals who had served in
the army: individuals convicted of desertion, and individuals who had
prior federal criminal convictions.182 Of particular relevance here,
Truman’s pardon for convicted deserters was explicitly issued, in part,
to relieve pardoned offenders from the INA’s penalty for desertion
convictions: ineligibility for naturalization. More recently, President
Carter issued a categorical pardon that covered approximately a half-
million men (most of whom had not been charged) who had violated
draft laws during the Vietnam War in order to “heal the war’s psychic
wounds.”183 This broad pardon was based on special boards through
which Presidents Truman and Ford granted clemency to tens of
thousands of individuals who had violated draft laws during World
War II and the Vietnam War.184
179 See 2 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction
(announcing the pardon), in COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 442 (John G.
Nicolay & John Hay eds., 1894); see also 2 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Proclamation About
Amnesty (defining who could benefit from the pardon), in COMPLETE WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra, at 504.
180 See, e.g., President Johnson, Proclamation 179—Granting Full Pardon and Amnesty
for the Offense of Treason Against the United States During the Late Civil War (1868);
President Johnson, Proclamation 134—A Offer of Pardon to Deserters from the Regular
Army Who Surrender, Gen. Order 43 (1866).
181 See GRAHAM G. DODDS, TAKE UP YOUR PEN: UNILATERAL PRESIDENTIAL
DIRECTIVES IN AMERICAN POLITICS 114 (2013) (noting Presidents Harrison’s and
Cleveland’s proclamations granting amnesty to Mormon polygamists); see also Harold J.
Krent, Conditioning the President’s Conditional Pardon Power, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1665,
1675 (2001) (highlighting “President Benjamin Harrison’s pardon of Mormons convicted of
polygamy in the Utah territory”).
182 See Proclamation No. 3000 and 3001, 17 Fed. Reg. 11,833 (Dec. 31, 1952).
183 Andrew Glass, Carter Pardons Draft Dodgers Jan. 21, 1977, POLITICO (Jan. 21, 2008),
http://www.politico.com/story/2008/01/carter-pardons-draft-dodgers-jan-21-1977-007974;
see also Proclamation No. 4483, Granting Pardon for Violations of the Selective Service
Act, August 4, 1964 to March 28, 1973, 42 Fed. Reg. 4391 (Jan. 24, 1977).
184 Exec. Order No. 9814, 11 Fed. Reg. 14,645 (Dec. 25, 1946); U.S. PRESIDENTIAL
CLEMENCY BD., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (1975) (containing an extensive description
and analysis of the board’s activities during its first year of existence, addressed to
President Ford); Shanor & Miller, supra note 176, at 140, 142 (describing how President
Ford’s Clemency Board was modeled after President Truman’s Amnesty Board).
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Notably, disagreement with Congress was often the key reason
that these pardons were issued. One of the earliest examples is Presi-
dent Jefferson’s pardon of each and every person who had been con-
victed under the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, which criminalized
the writing, printing, and publication of defamatory or inflammatory
materials about the U.S. government.185 Jefferson, who had criticized
these acts even prior to his election, was explicit about his motivation:
He issued pardons because, “even though [the Sedition Act] had been
upheld by the courts,” he “[b]eliev[ed] that the Sedition Law was
unconstitutional,” and therefore “used his power as President to (in
his own words) ‘remit the execution’ of the Act by pardoning all
offenders.”186 Presidents Lincoln and Johnson’s proclamations of
amnesty and pardons were intended to thwart punitive laws imposed
by Congress.187 In a similar fashion, President Wilson expressed his
opposition to prohibition laws after Congress overrode his veto of the
Volstead Act by pardoning more than 500 liquor law violators,188 and
President Kennedy commuted the sentences of hundreds of drug
offenders serving mandatory minimum sentences under the Narcotics
Control Act of 1956, presumably because he deemed the Act’s sen-
tencing provisions too harsh.189
185 See, e.g., Act of July 4, 1840, c. 45, 6 Stat. 802, accompanied by H.R. REP. NO. 26-86
(1840) (refunding a fine imposed under the Sedition laws).
186 The Legal Significance of Presidential Signing Statements, 17 Op. O.L.C. 131, 133 n.8
(1993) (citing NORMAN J. SMALL, SOME PRESIDENTIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
PRESIDENCY 21 (1932)); see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (Sept. 11,
1804) (discussing Jefferson’s role as President and his views on the Sedition laws), in THE
ADAMS-JEFFERSON LETTERS 278, 279 (Lester J. Cappon ed., 1959); Saikrishna Bangalore
Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1666
(2008) (describing letters in which President Jefferson explained that he “discharged every
person under punishment or prosecution under the Sedition laws, because [he] considered
. . . that law to be nullity as absolute and as palpable as if Congress had ordered us to fall
down and worship a golden image”).
187 The validity of these amnesties was repeatedly upheld by the Supreme Court. See,
e.g., United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 142 (1871) (upholding President
Lincoln’s pardon); United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531, 542 (1869), superseded
by statute, Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 235, as recognized in Bank Markazi v.
Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016) (same); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866)
(upholding President Johnson’s pardon).
188 See Barkow, supra note 13, at 837; P.S. Ruckman, Jr., The Pardoning Power: The
Other “Civics Lesson,” 8 (Nov. 7, 2001), http://www.rvc.cc.il.us/faclink/pruckman/
pardoncharts/paper5.pdf (describing President Wilson’s pardons and providing clemency
statistics).
189 See Barkow, supra note 13, at 837 (noting that President Kennedy “granted
clemency to hundreds of first-time nonviolent drug offenders as an expression of
disagreement with mandatory drug punishments in certain cases he viewed as disparate
and not consistent with average sentences in comparable cases”); see also Shanor & Miller,
supra note 176, at 140 (noting that President Kennedy pardoned offenders under the
Narcotics Act of 1956).
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The Supreme Court has upheld categorical pardons and recog-
nized their constitutional validity.190 The Court has explained that
broad pardons, or “amnesties,” are simply a permissible extension of
the President’s power to pardon an individual: “The Executive can
reprieve or pardon all offenses after their commission, either before
trial, during trial or after trial, by individuals, or by classes, condition-
ally or absolutely, and this without modification or regulation by
Congress.”191 And it has explicitly rejected the argument that class-
wide amnesties are different from a pardon in a way relevant here,
remarking that “[t]he distinction between amnesty and pardon is of no
practical”192 or “legal importance.”193 Thus, because the President
could issue a categorical pardon that would relieve classes of non-
citizens of certain immigration offenses, the immigration pardon can
offer far-reaching protection to members of our community who
Congress has, thus far, proven unable or unwilling to protect.
B. Structural Constitutional Implications of
 Categorical Immigration Pardons
One need not be a constitutional scholar to wonder why the pres-
idential pardon power—particularly when used to grant categorical
relief from the penalties of duly enacted laws—does not violate the
constitutional principle of separation of powers. After all, a President
who could categorically absolve all violators of a particular law could
effectively nullify it in many respects, thereby infringing on the legisla-
ture’s constitutional authority “[t]o make all Laws.”194 This concern is
not surprising, as it is generally well accepted that a President may
190 See, e.g., Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 153 (1877) (“All the benefits which can
result to the claimant from both pardon and amnesty would equally have accrued to him if
the term ‘pardon’ alone had been used in the proclamation of the President. In Klein’s
case, this court said that pardon included amnesty.” (citing United States v. Klein, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 128 (1871))); supra note 175. The English King’s power to pardon, which is
coextensive with the scope of the presidential pardon power, see supra notes 62–63, offers
further confirmation. See Duker, supra note 66, at 517 (first citing the Charta Forestae, 9
Hen. 3, c. 15 (1225) (King’s first general pardon); then citing 50 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1376) (general
pardon granted to celebrate the fiftieth year of Edward III’s reign and confirmed by I Rich.
2, c. 10 (1377)); then citing 6 Rich. 2, c. 13, § 1 (1382) (pardon to all subjects after the late
insurrection); then citing 6 Rich. 2, c. I, § 1 (1382) (a “more large Pardon”); then citing Act
of Free and General Pardon, 12 Car. 2, c. 11 (1660) (general pardon issued by Charles II);
then citing Act for the King’s Majesties Most Gracious, General and Free Pardon, 25 Car.
2, c. 5 (1672); then citing 2 W. & M., c. 10, § 1 (1690); then citing 6 & 7 Will. 3, c. 20 (1695);
then citing 3 Geo. 1, c. 19 (1716); and then citing 20 Geo. 2, c. 52 (1747)).
191 Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120 (1925) (emphasis added) (citing Ex parte
Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866)).
192 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 601 (1896).
193 Knote, 95 U.S. at 153.
194 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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not, consistent with separation-of-powers principles enshrined in the
Constitution, simply ignore or effectively override statutes because he
or she disagrees with congressional policy. And yet, using a categorical
pardon to absolve individuals of penalties for violating a law—as
Presidents have done throughout history—seems to do exactly that.
What would stop a President from using this power to gut congres-
sional authority across any of the civil regulatory efforts prevalent in
the administrative state that are contrary to presidential policy?
At the outset, it is important to recognize that, in examining the
structural constitutional question here, context matters: Concerns
about this issue should be least where the branch exercising the
authority is effecting the goals underlying the separation-of-powers
principle.195 And that goal, the Framers made clear, was to secure and
protect liberty.196 In 1788, Madison made this very point when
explaining the reason for separation of powers: “When the legislative
and executive powers are united in the same person or body, . . . there
can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the same mon-
arch or senate should enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyran-
nical manner.”197 Scholars and political theorists have echoed this
point, emphasizing that the protection of liberty was a central goal
195 Although neither “separation of powers” nor any synonym is used in the
Constitution itself, the constitutional structure and Framers’ commentary have left little
doubt that this principle was enshrined in the Constitution. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers
Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1215 (2015) (stating that “‘separation of powers’ and ‘the
constitutional system of checks and balances’ [are] core principles of our constitutional
design”); Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 483 (2011) (discussing “‘the basic concept of
separation of powers . . . that flow[s] from the scheme of a tripartite government’ adopted
in the Constitution” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
704 (1974))); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742 (2008) (describing the historical
context and rationale for the structural protection of individual rights adopted by the
Framers and noting “[t]he Framers’ inherent distrust of governmental power was the
driving force behind the constitutional plan that allocated powers among three
independent branches”); Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of
Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 272 (1991) (“The ultimate purpose of this separation of
powers is to protect the liberty and security of the governed.”); Rebecca L. Brown,
Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1533–40 (1991)
(discussing the historical and intellectual development of the separation of powers); Peter
L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 578 (1984) (describing how checks and balances and the
separation of powers were designed “to protect the citizens from the emergence of
tyrannical government”).
196 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty . . . .”); see also
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 742; Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 501 U.S. at 272.
197 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 303 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis added and omitted) (quoting Montesquieu).
40084-nyu_93-1 Sheet No. 53 Side A      04/02/2018   14:13:19
40084-nyu_93-1 Sheet No. 53 Side A      04/02/2018   14:13:19
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\93-1\NYU102.txt unknown Seq: 44 28-MAR-18 14:47
April 2018] PARDONING IMMIGRANTS 101
underlying the separation of powers.198 Moreover, they have recog-
nized that this goal was so important that the Framers concluded that
strict separation of powers did not adequately protect liberty.199 With
that in mind, they created a system of checks and balances that essen-
tially permitted the branches to “inva[de]” and “correct[ ]” overreach
so that each branch acted as a check on the other.200
That said, “liberty” materializes in many forms, and the Framers
undoubtedly sought to protect political liberty as well as physical lib-
erty.201 But even so, physical liberty is unique in terms of the protec-
tions written into the Constitution. Indeed, the Constitution contains
at least three separate provisions that authorize coordinate branches
to review and correct unjust deprivations of physical liberty. The Due
Process Clause,202 which offers protection against deprivation of life,
liberty, and property, reserves its greatest procedural protections for
deprivations of physical liberty. The Supreme Court has reaffirmed
the extent of its protections time and again, and recognized the fact
that physical restraint is “at the core of the liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause.”203 This protection, together with Article III,
198 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 195, at 1534 (“In general . . . separation of powers aimed
at the interconnected goals of preventing tyranny and protecting liberty.”); Harold J.
Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L. REV. 1253,
1259–60 (1988) (describing how the constitutional system of checks and balances was
designed “as a means of protecting individual liberty from arbitrary governance”);
Markowitz, supra note 10, at 530 (“Rather than aggrandizing one branch above the others,
the unilateral power of each branch to prevent liberty deprivation reflects a constitutional
structural bias against liberty deprivation in general.”).
199 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 308 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(“[U]nless these departments be so far connected and blended as to give to each a
constitutional control over the others, the degree of separation . . . essential to a free
government[ ] can never in practice be duly maintained.”); see also GARRY WILLS,
EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 119 (1981) (“Checks and balances do not arise
from separation theory, but are at odds with it . . . [and] have to do with corrective invasion
of the separated powers . . . .”); Brown, supra note 195, at 1532 (same).
200 WILLS, supra note 199, at 119; see also Brown, supra note 196, at 1531–32 (“The best
evidence that the Framers intended to reject a strict separation of powers is that they
created a system of checks and balances requiring participation by each branch in some
functions that may be considered part of the power of the others . . . .”).
201 Markowitz, supra note 10, at 528 (“While political theorists generally agree that the
system of separation of powers was envisioned primarily as a ‘prerequisite for civil liberty,’
political liberty as well as physical liberty was surely encompassed in this vision.” (footnote
omitted) (quoting Brown, supra note 195, at 1533)); see also Brown, supra note 195, at
1533 (“On the American side of the Atlantic the primary impetus for separated powers
was the establishment and maintenance of political liberty.”).
202 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
203 E.g., Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 445 (2011) (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504
U.S. 71, 80 (1992)); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (describing
physical liberty as “the most elemental of liberty interests”); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S.
504, 509 (1972) (describing the deprivation of physical liberty as “a massive curtailment of
liberty”).
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provides authority for the judiciary to protect against overreach by the
executive and legislative branches.204 Similarly, the Suspension
Clause, which provides access to judicial review for restraints on lib-
erty, permits the judiciary to correct unjust deprivations of liberty by
the executive and/or legislative branches.205 Finally, the Pardon
Clause, as discussed, permits the executive to limit or eliminate
restraints upon liberty that could be imposed or have been imposed by
the legislature and/or the judiciary.206 Moreover, underscoring the
unique place of physical liberty in the Constitution, the Framers went
further even than some of their exemplars who tolerated bills of
attainder—legislative pronouncements of guilt—as necessary evils.207
Instead, out of a desire to guard against the possibility of unjust depri-
vations of liberty, the Framers drafted a constitutional provision
explicitly prohibiting them.208 Thus, to the extent that the statements
of the Framers leave any doubt that the separation-of-powers prin-
ciple is animated by a concern for protecting physical liberty, the con-
stitutional structure is clear about the primacy of liberty protection.
Given that a key aim of separating powers was to protect liberty, this
principle should be least offended when presidential authority—
indeed any branch’s authority—is effected to further that goal. Since
an immigration pardon power acts as a one-way ratchet in favor of
204 U.S. CONST. art. III; see Markowitz, supra note 10, at 529–30, 532 (describing how
the Supreme Court “has not only extended a panoply of special procedural protections
when physical liberty is at issue, but it has also characterized the deprivation of physical
liberty as being ‘at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause’” and
explaining that “[m]odern jurisprudence demonstrates that creating special protections
against unwarranted liberty deprivations is entirely consistent with the constitutional
scheme”).
205 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. More specifically, the Suspension Clause guarantees
access to the writ of habeas corpus to challenge a restraint on liberty except “in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion [when] the public Safety may require it.” Id.; see Boumediene v.
Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 745 (2008) (“[The Suspension Clause] ensures that, except during
periods of formal suspension, the Judiciary will have a time-tested device, the writ, to
maintain the ‘delicate balance of governance’ that is itself the surest safeguard of liberty.”
(citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536)); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300–03 (2001) (surveying the
history of the Suspension Clause, describing its fundamental purpose of protecting against
unlawful deprivations of liberty, and finding deportation to be one such deprivation of
liberty).
206 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
207 Brown, supra note 195, at 1536–37 (describing Montesquieu’s view of bills of
attainder as “a necessary, single instance in which a branch other than the Judiciary should
be permitted to make a decision affecting the liberty of an individual . . . ‘in order to
preserve it for the whole community’” (quoting BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF
THE LAWS 199 (Thomas Nugent trans., 1949))).
208 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed.”).
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liberty protection, separation-of-powers concerns are somewhat
mitigated.
In addition to these structural constraints, characteristics of the
Pardon Clause itself provide powerful limits on its reach and incen-
tives against abusing the pardon power.209 Most importantly, even at
its most expansive, the pardon power does not permit a President to,
in fact or effect, actually nullify a duly enacted law because he or she
cannot pardon future offenses.210 This foundational limitation, dis-
cussed in Part I, was an essential element of the Pardon Clause from
the outset, and an important way in which the Constitution differed
from old English common law. In England, at common law, the King
had “dispensing” and “suspending” powers which allowed the King to
authorize individuals to violate laws enacted by Parliament and to
abrogate parliamentary laws, respectively.211 The pardon power, by
contrast, only permits the President to relieve an individual of prose-
cution for, or penalties flowing from, the commission of past
offenses.212 In this way, the Framers ensured that the President’s
power to offer mercy would not be used to abrogate or suspend laws
and thereby encroach on Congress’s lawmaking authority.
Pardons are also limited by their nature to operate in a space that
the executive has exclusive authority to create. That is, they reduce or
eliminate the consequences of an enforcement proceeding, which only
the executive may commence.213 To return briefly to the tax law
example, this means that a President is powerless to change what the
209 See Morison, supra note 13, at 278–88 (describing a range of structural constraints
that the Constitution imposes on the pardon power).
210 See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866) (“The [pardon] power thus
conferred is unlimited, with the exception stated. It extends to every offence known to the
law, and may be exercised at any time after its commission, either before legal proceedings
are taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment.”); Stauffer v.
Brooks Bros. Grp., 758 F.3d 1314, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (defining pardons and finding that
amendments to law “do not constitute a pardon”).
211 EDWARD WAVELL RIDGES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ENGLAND 134–35 (1905)
(discussing dispensing and suspending powers and legal challenges to use); Markowitz,
supra note 10, at 500–01 (discussing the King’s suspending and dispensing powers); Price,
supra note 14, at 691 (discussing suspending and dispensing powers and their ultimate
invalidation); Daniel Stepanicich, Comment, Presidential Inaction and the Constitutional
Basis for Executive Nonenforcement Discretion, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1507, 1513–14
(2016) (same).
212 See Passenger Laws—Pardoning Power, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 393, 403 (1854) (“A
pardon for an offence not yet committed would be void.”); see also Garland, 71 U.S. at 380
(stating how the pardon power “extends to every offence known to the law, and may be
exercised at any time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are taken, or
during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment” (emphasis added)).
213 See Hickey v. Schomig, 240 F. Supp. 2d 793, 795 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (“[N]o federal
official has the authority to commute a sentence imposed by a state court.”); Office of the
Pardon Att’y, supra note 18 (“[T]he President cannot pardon a state criminal offense.”).
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tax law requires individuals to report or pay, or what it prohibits indi-
viduals from writing off. The President’s pardon authority is limited to
a question in which the executive is constitutionally assigned a signifi-
cant amount of power: whether to prosecute someone who fails to pay
what they owe, what charges to file, and what penalties to seek. In this
sense, pardons are, for constitutional purposes, much like
prosecutorial discretion, which, with some recent exceptions, is gener-
ally accepted as consistent with the Constitution and separation of
powers.214 In short, the very definition of a pardon makes it operate
primarily in the arena of decisions that the executive branch is author-
ized to make, such that the executive is “giv[ing] what is his own,” not
“that which is another’s [and that] he cannot give by his own
grace.”215
Ultimately, history and the Supreme Court have made clear that,
under the Constitution, “each of the great co-ordinate departments of
the government—the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial—
shall be, in its sphere, independent of the others,” and that “[t]o the
executive alone is entrusted the power of pardon,” even if used in
conflict with congressional policy.216
214 For example, under President Clinton, the Department of Justice (DOJ) enacted a
“Corporate Leniency Policy” that, in the words of DOJ, is an “amnesty or corporate
immunity policy” that grants corporations effective immunity from criminal prosecution, as
well as their directors, officers, and employees, if the corporation is the first to come
forward and report illegal antitrust activity and take certain other remedial steps. See
Antitrust Div., Corporate Leniency Policy, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/atr/legacy/2007/08/14/0091.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5VS-MKZX]. Note that
DOJ itself made clear that this policy was categorical and “not subject to the exercise of
[individualized] prosecutorial discretion.” Gary R. Spratling, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.,
Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the ABA Antitrust Section 1998 Spring
Meeting: The Corporate Leniency Policy: Answers to Recurring Questions (Apr. 1, 1998),
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1626.htm [https://perma.cc/CNZ6-HNBK].
Presidents Truman and Carter’s broad grants of amnesty after WWII and the Vietnam War
are another example. Exec. Order No. 9814, 11 Fed. Reg. 14,645 (Dec. 25, 1946) (creating
the President’s Amnesty Board to review convictions of persons under the Selective
Training and Service Act of 1940); U.S. PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY BD., REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT xi–xii (1975) (discussing President Ford’s clemency program); Shanor & Miller,
supra note 176, at 142 (describing examples of “systematic pardons”).
215 United States v. Noonan, 906 F.2d 952, 956 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting 2 HENRICI DE
BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE 371 (Travers Twiss ed. & trans.,
1879) (1257)); see supra Section II.B; supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text. Modern
pardon jurisprudence also underscores this limitation on a pardon’s reach. As described
above, it distinguishes between penalties for an offense, which are eliminated by a pardon,
from qualifications that a person cannot satisfy due to past misconduct, which a pardon
does not affect. The inability of pardons to affect a person’s ability to satisfy nonpenalty
requirements or qualifications is an additional mechanism that preserves legislatures’ and
courts’ authority in areas outside those that implicate actual or potential enforcement.
216 United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1871); see Pub. Citizen v. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 485 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[W]here the
Constitution by explicit text commits the power at issue to the exclusive control of the
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Any expansive view of presidential power should be embraced
cautiously and with due consideration of the potential for abuse. The
reckless and unprincipled approach of the current Oval Office occu-
pant only serves to heighten such caution. Indeed, grave concerns
about the abuse of the pardon power by President Trump have been
center stage in the early months of his presidency.217 Every grant of
power comes with the risk of abuse; however, on balance, the vision of
the pardon power we embrace carries a greater potential for serving
justice than for prompting abuse. Issuance of a broad categorical
immigration pardon would be a robust assertion of presidential
power, but one consistent with the Constitution’s structural bias in
favor of liberty protection and with the President’s primary control of
enforcement more generally.
CONCLUSION
The brutality of our nation’s current immigration enforcement
scheme is difficult to overstate: Hundreds of thousands of mothers,
fathers, sons, and daughters each year face detention and permanent
separation from their families in the United States. The ideal solution
is, unquestionably, significant legislative reform to provide a path to
legalization for undocumented immigrants and to eliminate the
harshest aspects of the detention and removal provisions of the INA.
However, congressional reform of our immigration system has long
been a dead letter, and with the current presidential administration
addressing the issue through vilification and shotgun-style enforce-
ment, there is little short-term hope of meaningful legislative progress.
If the congressional gridlock cannot be broken, there will come a time
when future Presidents—particularly those elected by an increasingly
minority electorate with more recent immigrant roots—will need to
President, we have refused to tolerate any intrusion by the Legislative Branch. . . . [W]e
[have] reiterated in most direct terms the principle that Congress cannot interfere in any
way with the President’s power to pardon.”); Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 266 (1974)
(“[T]he unbroken practice since 1790 compels the conclusion that the power flows from
the Constitution alone, not from any legislative enactments, and that it cannot be modified,
abridged, or diminished by the Congress.”); Garland, 71 U.S. at 380 (“This power of the
President is not subject to legislative control. . . . The benign prerogative of mercy reposed
in him cannot be fettered by any legislative restrictions.”).
217 See, e.g., John Yoo, Opinion, Trump Can Pardon Manafort. He Shouldn’t., N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 31, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2z3Rl72; see also Neil H. Buchanan, Will Trump Use
Arpaio Pardon as a Precedent to Pardon Russia Colluders?, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 30, 2017),
http://www.newsweek.com/will-trump-use-arpaio-precedent-pardon-russia-colluders-
657025; Philip Allen Lacovara, Opinion, How the Pardon Power Could End Trump’s
Presidency, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2017), http://wapo.st/2go0SAe?tid=SS_mail&utm_term
=.455b1c45a98c.
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find ways to ameliorate the devastating penalties that our immigration
laws have imposed on longtime members of our communities.
The immigration pardon, one exercise of the executive’s more
general prosecutorial discretion powers, offers an important part of
that solution. While direct categorical application of the pardon power
to civil immigration offenses has no immediate precedent in history, it
accords with the very purpose for which Presidents have, for centu-
ries, issued categorical pardons: to use their inherent power of mercy
and duty to promote the national interest to alleviate the toll of harsh
laws on politically unpopular groups. It is for these reasons that the
Framers bestowed the pardon power upon Presidents—as a critical
check against Congress’s general authority to make all laws. The
pardon power serves as an essential backstop to avert unduly harsh
negative consequences of legislative enactments. As the devastation
caused by current immigration laws continues to grow and traditional
mechanisms for policymaking continue to fail, future Presidents
should consider using the pardon power to forgive the civil offenses
that result in some of the most unforgiving penalties in our justice
system.
